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LEGITIMATE INTERPRETATION—OR
LEGITIMATE ADJUDICATION?
Thomas W. Merrill†

Current debate about the legitimacy of lawmaking by
courts focuses on what constitutes legitimate interpretation.
The debate has reached an impasse in that originalism and
textualism appear to have the stronger case as a matter of
theory while living constitutionalism and dynamic interpretation provide much better account of actual practice. This Article argues that if we refocus the debate by asking what
constitutes legitimate adjudication, as determined by the social practice of the parties and their lawyers who take part in
adjudication, it is possible to develop an account of legitimacy
that produces a much better fit between theory and practice.
The decisional norms employed by adjudicators include faithful agent arguments about governing texts, arguments from
precedent, and arguments from settled practice, but also, in a
more qualified fashion, considerations of morality and social
consequences. Adjudicators mix and match these norms in
reaching outcomes but do so in a way that is regarded as
legitimate by the losers as well as the winners in contested
adjudications. A general normative implication of this
refocused account of legitimacy is that adjudicators, including
high-level appeals courts, should not stray far from their basic
function of dispute resolution, as opposed to law declaration.
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INTRODUCTION: CHANGING THE FOCUS
This is an Article about the legitimacy of lawmaking by
adjudicative bodies, most prominently, but not exclusively,
courts. The question to be considered is this: When adjudicators resolve a dispute between adverse parties, what types of
decisional norms can the adjudicator invoke that will be regarded as legitimate?
Currently, the dominant mode of inquiry about the legitimacy of decisional norms is framed in terms of legitimate interpretation of enacted texts. Thus, in constitutional law, we find
vigorous debates between “originalists” and “living constitutionalists.”1 As a matter of theory, the originalists appear to be
winning, based on powerful arguments grounded in the consent of the governed and the nature of communicative acts
more generally. 2 As a matter of descriptive accuracy, however,
1
For overviews of the literature, see Mitchell N. Berman, Originalism is
Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Henry Paul Monaghan, Supremacy Clause
Textualism, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 731, 781–96 (2010).
2
For the argument from the consent of the governed, see KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 110–113 (1999). For the argument from the nature of communicative
acts, see, e.g., Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66
DUKE L.J. 979, 987–98 (2017) (summarizing the view that interpretation requires
the attribution of intent to the speaker); Lawrence B. Solum, The Fixation Thesis:
The Role of Historical Fact in Original Meaning, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 20-30
(2015) (summarizing argument for determining the meaning of a text as of the
time it is promulgated). This hardly exhausts the arguments for originalism. See
also RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY 88–89, 253–56 (2004) (adhering to the original meaning of the Constitution promotes individual liberty); JOHN O. MCGINNIS & MICHAEL B. RAPPAPORT,
ORIGINALISM AND THE GOOD CONSTITUTION 33 (2013) (arguing that the supermajority
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the living constitutionalists have by far the better case since
the understanding of the Constitution enforced by the courts
today bears little resemblance, in many ways large and small,
to the understanding of the text when it was ratified.3 The
great tension this has created explains the emergence of claims
that one can be both an originalist and yet can also embrace
the evolving nature of constitutional law. 4 So far, however, no
version of “living originalism” appears to have garnered general
assent.
In statutory interpretation, the primary theoretical debate
pits “textualists” against “purposivists.”5 Textualists point out
that the only thing actually enacted by the legislature is the
text of the statute; legislative purposes (unless also set forth in
the text) are likely to vary from one legislator to another and are
qualified by compromises reflected in how the statute provides
for its implementation or enforcement.6 Purposivists counter
that the words of the text make sense only when read in context, which means only in light of the evident purpose(s) of the
enactment; moreover, interpreters inevitably rely on various
aids and devices—like canons of construction—which are not
themselves part of the text adopted by the legislature.7 Debate
continues over whether these conflicting perspectives are sussupport required to ratify and amend the Constitution increases the likelihood
that its provisions advance social welfare).
3
See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1232–49 (1994) (documenting the ways in which modern
administrative law is inconsistent with the original understanding of the
Constitution).
4
See, e.g., JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 3 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN,
LIVING ORIGINALISM] (suggesting that a living constitutionalist approach and an
originalist approach are “compatible rather than opposed”); William Baude, Is
Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2349–61 (2015) (describing a
version of originalism more open to giving weight to precedent than is commonly
supposed); Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in CONSTITUTIONAL
ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 67–71 (2011) (arguing for a broad role for “constitutional
construction” consistent with a commitment to original meaning).
5
See generally Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The
Revival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241 (1992) (documenting the rise of theoretical debate about the proper approach to statutory
interpretation). For overviews, see generally John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 70, 70–78 (2006); Caleb Nelson,
What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 347–53 (2005).
6
See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y. 61, 64–68 (1994) (discussing statutory
interpretation and noting how legislation is produced through compromise).
7
See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 845–48 (1992) (defending the use of legislative
history when interpreting statutes).
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ceptible of reconciliation in some sort of synthesis.8 Meanwhile, the perspective that seems to match actual practice most
closely—at least with respect to framework legislation that has
been subject to frequent interpretation—is dynamic interpretation. 9 The dynamic account emphasizes how interpretations
change over time in response to different readings of precedent
that reflect changing social values. But this account seems
difficult to justify in terms of either textualist or purposivist
theory.
In both constitutional and statutory contexts, the inquiry
proceeds as a series of debates about the proper way to interpret particular legal texts, whether it be the Constitution or a
particular statute. The authority of the texts themselves remains unquestioned; the question is what they mean. And the
performance of any actor in declaring what the text means is
assessed against rival norms of what constitutes legitimate
interpretation.
I propose to discuss the legitimacy of decisional norms
from a different perspective: that of a particular type of institutional actor—the adjudicator. There are two critical reasons for
changing the focus from legitimate interpretation to legitimate
adjudication.
The first is that such a change in perspective creates a
better fit between theory and practice. Interpretation of the
language of texts constitutes only a portion of what adjudicators do. Adjudication draws on a number of other decisional
variables including, most notably, findings of fact, both historical facts about the parties to the adjudication and more general
legislative facts that bear on the dispute. Adjudicators also pay
careful attention to precedent, typically prior decisions of
higher-level tribunals and of the tribunal that engages in the
adjudication. In addition, adjudicators often refer, explicitly or
implicitly, to considerations of equity, fairness, or justice in
rendering their decisions. And finally, at least occasionally,
adjudicators will consider the consequences of particular deci8
Compare Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 35–36 (2006) (arguing that textualism and purposivism are converging),
with Jonathan R. Siegel, The Inexorable Radicalization of Textualism, 158 U. PA. L.
REV. 117, 131–32 (2009) (arguing that the textualists’ rejection of legislative history precludes any reconciliation).
9
See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
5–11 (1994) [hereinafter ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC] (advancing the thesis that “statutory
interpretation is dynamic”). For empirical support, which unfortunately is rather
dated, see Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An
Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073, 1098–1107 (1992).
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sions in terms of social welfare. In practice, these decisional
variables are interwoven in the process of adjudication. References to the meaning of the text will be mixed up with findings
of fact, precedents, and notions of equity or social welfare. The
perceived legitimacy of an adjudicator will be a function of how
the adjudicator deploys these decisional elements in combination, not just how the adjudicator interprets the language of
enacted laws.
The multiplicity of factors that adjudicators draw upon in
reaching decisions obviously complicates any assessment of
what will be regarded as legitimate adjudication. Arguably it is
preferable to abstract away from these complications and consider what constitutes legitimate interpretation free from these
complications. But this kind of abstraction comes at a very
high cost in terms of realism. For example, commentators furiously debate whether the Supreme Court should interpret the
Constitution in accordance with its original understanding,
and if so, whether it should do so at a high level of abstraction
or in terms of historically fixed meanings.10 Yet in its decisions
that arise under the Constitution, the Court relies primarily on
precedents interpreting the Constitution.11 Only occasionally
does the Court engage with evidence of original understanding
in a way that is directly relevant to the outcome of the case.
Commentators are forced either to ignore actual practice, treat
it as an irritating exception, or condemn it as illegitimate. 12 An
approach that begins from the perspective of legitimate adjudication promises to produce a theory that captures a much
larger portion of actual practice.
The second reason for changing the focus from legitimate
interpretation to legitimate adjudication is that it promises to
suppress—at least to a degree—the growing perception that
judges engage in political decision making. This is because the
10
Compare BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 263–68 (arguing for
high level of abstraction that necessarily evolves), with John O. McGinnis &
Michael B. Rappaport, The Abstract Meaning Fallacy, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 737, 739
(arguing that broad constitutional language may have concrete or general legal
meanings, as opposed to abstract meaning, and that the proper interpretation
must be determined by historical evidence).
11
See DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 33 (2010).
12
See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 410 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(dismissing leading precedent as contrary to the original understanding of the
First Amendment); Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Intrinsically Corrupting Influence
of Precedent, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 289, 289 (2005) (arguing that it is illegitimate to
allow precedent to trump original understanding); Antonin Scalia, Originalism:
The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861 (1989) (treating precedent as an
irritating exception to originalism).

R
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rival schools of thought in the disputes about legitimate interpretation have a distinct political valence. In constitutional
law, those who espouse originalism are perceived to be hostile
to Roe v. Wade13 and the regime of abortion rights it established, while championing individual gun ownership under the
Second Amendment.14 Those who favor a living Constitution
are regarded as holding the opposite views. In statutory interpretation, textualists are seen as favoring narrow interpretations of civil rights and environmental statutes; purposive or
dynamic interpreters are assumed to harbor the opposite positions. Whether or not these perceptions are strictly accurate,
they have come to serve as signaling devices in assessing candidates for the bench and feed into bitter partisan battles over
judicial appointments. Potential nominees who convey sympathy with originalism or textualism are championed by Republicans and are frantically opposed by Democrats; those who
express skepticism about these interpretive theories elicit the
opposite responses.
Obviously, a change in the theory of legitimacy cannot by
itself save the judiciary from descending into the maw of partisanship. But if it would help even a little bit it would be worth
the effort. The stakes could not be higher. As the political
branches sink into growing animosity, and political polarization is increasingly reflected in geographic polarization, it becomes critical to preserve the authority of institutions
dedicated to peaceful dispute resolution. The best way to preserve the legitimacy of courts and other adjudicators, this Article contends, is to assess the performance of these institutions
in terms of norms of legitimate dispute resolution, not legitimate law declaration.
In pursuing the question of what constitutes legitimate adjudication I will follow the lead of H.L.A. Hart and modern legal
positivists in looking to social practice as the source of legitimacy. Legitimacy as I use the term is not something that can
be deduced from a higher-level premise, like the consent of the
governed, the nature of communicative acts, or conformance
with the ideals of international human rights. It is, instead, a
function of sociology or what Hart called social practice.15 Hart
and his successors have been concerned with identifying what
13

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635–37 (2008) (interpreting the Second Amendment to protect an individual’s right to possess firearms).
15
H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100–17 (3d ed. 2012). See also Richard
H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787,
1792–1802 (2005) (distinguishing legal, sociological, and moral concepts of legiti14
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is regarded as “law” by considering the social practices of officials, most prominently courts.16 In particular, they postulate
that law is determined by courts applying a rule of recognition,
which is in turn a function of social practice. The major departure from Hartian approach in this Article involves the identity
of the “recognitional community” that determines legitimacy. 17
I argue that the critical community that determines what constitutes legitimate adjudication consists of the losers in adjudication, as advised by their lawyers. The losers will commonly
regard the decision as wrong. But as long as they regard the
outcome as legitimate, they will comply with the judgment.
Adjudicators cannot afford to incur more than occasional defiance of their judgments; hence they will systematically strive to
reach judgments that both the winners and the losers regard
as legitimate.
The effort here to explicate the norms of legitimate adjudication is primarily descriptive or interpretive, rather than prescriptive or normative. Nevertheless, in the final section of the
Article, I will consider three possible normative implications of
the analysis. Each of these implications concerns ways in
which the law-declaration function of adjudicators appears to
be ascendant and the dispute-resolution function in retreat.
Each presents a growing risk that the judiciary will be perceived, at least by the losers in contested cases, as having
eschewed the norms of legitimate adjudication in favor of
adopting decisional norms preferred by the winner. The first
involves the vexed question of how and when to adopt faithful
agent modes of argument in adjudicating claims brought under
very old and effectively unamendable laws like the Constitution. The second concerns the manner in which adjudicators
deploy arguments from precedent in rendering their decisions,
particularly the growing use of what I call “Scrabble Board
precedentialism.” This leaves existing precedent undisturbed
and quotes extensively from previous opinions while in fact
endorsing significant innovations in law that deviate from a fair
integration of prior precedent and settled practice. The third
macy and endorsing the sociological perspective as the most useful for purposes
of jurisprudential analysis).
16
See generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., LAW AND LEGITIMACY IN THE SUPREME
COURT 83–104 (2018) [hereinafter FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY] (describing a “practice based” theory of legitimacy for assessing the performance of the Supreme
Court).
17
The phrase “recognitional community” is taken from Matthew D. Adler,
Popular Constitutionalism and the Rule of Recognition: Whose Practices Ground
U.S. Law?, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 719, 726 (2006).
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concerns the rapid growth in the issuance of universal injunctions by federal district courts in order to block immigration
initiatives adopted by the executive branch. In our politically
polarized world, with rapidly expanding perceptions that the
judiciary is also politically polarized, each of these trends, if not
checked, poses a threat to the legitimacy of courts as our primary instrument of peaceful dispute resolution.
I
THE FOUNDATIONS OF LEGITIMATE ADJUDICATION
A. The Centrality of Dispute Resolution
Adjudication has a function that distinguishes it from
other activities that entail interpretation of enacted texts. The
primary purpose of adjudication is to resolve a dispute. Often,
these are disputes between private, i.e., nongovernmental, actors. Sometimes the dispute is between the government and a
nongovernmental actor. In either form, the primary purpose of
adjudication is to resolve a conflict pitting A against B. Other
interpreters may be interested in avoiding, creating, influencing, or predicting the outcome of such conflicts. But they are
not charged with resolving conflicts, which is the distinctive
function of adjudication.
That adjudication entails dispute resolution is true virtually by definition.18 That dispute resolution is the primary purpose of adjudication has been proclaimed by many esteemed
authorities.19 Yet we do not have to rest on a priori reasoning
to perceive the centrality of dispute resolution to the institution
of adjudication. This is revealed in a number of social practices
of adjudicators, at least in the American legal tradition.

18
Adjudication, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019) (defining “adjudication” as “[t]he legal process of resolving a dispute”).
19
KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: SOME LECTURES ON LAW AND ITS STUDY
12 (1930); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 175–76
(2d ed. 2009); Neil MacCormick, Why Cases Have Rationes and What These Are,
in PRECEDENT IN LAW 158–59 (Laurence Goldstein ed., 1991). The fountainhead of
American public law, Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803),
rests on the dispute resolution function of courts as the source of judicial authority. Those who endorse a broad “law declaration” function for the courts often
quote the line from Marbury that it is “the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is.” Id. They commonly omit the very next
sentence, which explains why this is the “province and duty” of the courts: “Those
who apply the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and interpret
that rule.” Id. (emphasis added).
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First, adjudicators will dismiss an action if it appears that
there is no actual dispute to be resolved.20 This is especially
prominent in the practice of federal courts, although it also
characterizes state courts and even administrative agencies to
a significant degree. Thus, the Supreme Court has developed
an elaborate jurisprudence of standing, designed to weed out
cases brought by persons who cannot claim to be suffering a
concrete and particularized injury that will be redressed by
adjudication.21 This jurisprudence is supplemented by strictures against deciding controversies that are moot, are insufficiently ripe, will be decided in due course by other tribunals, or
present questions that have been assigned to other branches of
government.22 The Court has largely justified these doctrines
on the ground that they are required by the language of the
Constitution describing the judicial power in terms of “cases”
and “controversies.”23 A deeper rationale is the understanding
that the core function of adjudication is dispute resolution.
Second, an adjudication results in a decision that is binding only on the parties that have presented their dispute to the

20
See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20 (1998) (“[C]ourts will not ‘pass
upon . . . abstract, intellectual problems,’ but adjudicate ‘concrete, living contest[s] between adversaries.’”) (second alteration in original) (quoting Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939)); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union,
442 U.S. 289, 297–98 (1979) (“The basic inquiry is whether the ‘conflicting contentions of the parties . . . present a real, substantial controversy between parties
having adverse legal interests, a dispute definite and concrete, not hypothetical or
abstract.’”) (quoting Ry. Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88, 93 (1945)); Muskrat v.
United States, 219 U.S. 346, 357 (1911) (noting that a prerequisite to bringing a
matter into court is “‘the existence of present or possible adverse parties, whose
contentions are submitted to the court for adjudication.’”).
21
See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1546–50 (2016) (summarizing the tenets of standing doctrine).
22
See DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 317 (1974) (stating that an action
is moot when it no longer “‘touch[es] the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests.’”) (alteration in original) (quoting Aetna Life Ins. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227, 240–41 (1937)); United Pub. Workers of Am. v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 90
(1947) (stating that a case is not ripe when the parties no longer need “judicial
authority for their protection against actual interference.”); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v.
Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 498 (1941) (abstaining from deciding a constitutional
claim because “[i]t touches a sensitive area of social policy upon which the federal
courts ought not to enter unless no alternative to its adjudication is open.”); see
also Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 230–38 (1993) (concluding that legal
questions regarding the impeachment process are assigned to Congress to
resolve).
23
See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (“Article III of the
Constitution confines the federal courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and
‘controversies.’”).
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tribunal for resolution.24 As to the parties, a final adjudication
is res judicata. If the loser defies the judgment, the winner can
bring an action for contempt or for execution on the judgment,
and the factual findings and legal conclusions reached in the
original action cannot be revisited.25 But if someone who is not
a party defies a legal interpretation reflected in an adjudication,
an adversary must bring an entirely new proceeding to secure
relief, and the defendant in the new proceeding is free to raise
any and all arguments in support of a contrary outcome.26 The
conclusions reached in the first adjudication may be given respectful consideration as a matter of precedent, but contestation will not be foreclosed. This reflects a basic understanding
that the only authority of an adjudicator to legally bind persons
is its power to enter judgments establishing the legal rights and
obligations of the parties who have presented their dispute to
the tribunal for its resolution.
Third, not only are judicial decisions binding on the parties, the Court has held that Congress has no power to override
final judicial judgments resolving individual disputes.27 The
Court reasoned that the “judicial power” given to federal courts
by Article III of the Constitution is the power to “render dispositive judgments” that conclusively resolve a case or controversy
between adverse parties.28 “Having achieved finality,” the
Court explained, “a judicial decision becomes the last word of
the judicial department with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable to that very case was something
other than what the courts said it was.”29 In other words,
dispute resolution is so central to the function of courts it must
be walled off from legislative intrusion.
Fourth, all adjudicators who issue written opinions follow a
practice of reciting in the opinion a relatively detailed account
of conflict between the parties and how that conflict came to be
presented to the adjudicator.30 Even the highest level appeals
courts do not proceed by announcing a legal issue and plung24
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 34(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1982); 18A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 4449 (3d ed. 2018).
25
Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as Binding Law and as Explanations
for Judgments, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 43, 66 (1993).
26
Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–62 (1989).
27
Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 211 (1995).
28
Id. at 219 (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook, Presidential Review, 40 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 905, 926 (1989)).
29
Id. at 227.
30
LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 94 (1968) [hereinafter FULLER, ANATOMY].
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ing into an explanation of how it will be resolved. They begin by
describing, usually in some detail, the history of the dispute
between the parties. Often these narratives include details that
are not strictly germane to the ultimate judgment the adjudicator settles upon. Yet the adjudicator will recite them in order to
clarify how the parties came into conflict and how the various
dimensions of that conflict have been resolved or have remained unresolved through earlier stages in the adjudication.
This practice reveals that adjudicators see their function as
fundamentally one of dispute resolution.
Finally, consider the performance of nominees for judicial
appointments in federal confirmation hearings. Regardless of
the party affiliation of the participants in these rituals, nominees always present themselves as committed to the dispute
resolution model of the judicial process. Whether it is Chief
Justice John Roberts, insisting that his job is simply to act as a
neutral umpire calling balls and strikes, 31 or Justice Sonia
Sotomayor, declining to “engage in a question that involves
hypotheses,”32 the nominee intuitively appreciates that the dispute resolution model is the one with the best chance of being
accepted as legitimate by his or her interlocutors. A nominee
who proclaims the primary function is something else (whether
it be promoting social justice or restoring the Constitution in
exile) would be attacked as proposing to “legislate from the
bench” and would face an enhanced risk of rejection.33
In stressing the centrality of dispute resolution, I do not
deny that adjudication serves additional functions. These include social control, especially in the criminal law context;34
“enrichment of the supply of legal rules,” especially in common
law cases;35 and preserving the supremacy of the Constitution
and federal law more generally, especially in cases presenting
31
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 55–56 (2005).
32
Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor, to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 103 (2009).
33
As a byproduct of this caution, confirmation hearings have become frustrating affairs for interlocutors. See Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and
New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 941 (1995) (reviewing STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994)) (noting that confirmation hearings (well before her own) have
become “a vapid and hollow charade, in which repetition of platitudes has replaced discussion of viewpoints and personal anecdotes have supplanted legal
analysis.”).
34
MARTIN SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 17–20 (1981)
[hereinafter SHAPIRO, COURTS].
35
MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 4 (1988).
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separation of powers and federalism disputes.36 All this is undoubtedly true. But it does not detract from the point that
dispute resolution is the sine qua non of adjudication.37
Courts and other adjudicators perform these additional functions only in the course of resolving disputes. Whether adjudication performs these or other functions is contingent on
special circumstances that are not invariably present.
The centrality of dispute resolution to the legitimacy of
adjudication has been emphasized in a trenchant analysis by
Martin Shapiro.38 His most general comments, supported by a
wide-ranging comparative analysis of courts in different societies, are worth quoting at length:
Cutting quite across cultural lines, it appears that whenever two persons come into a conflict that they cannot themselves solve, one solution appealing to common sense is to
call upon a third for assistance in achieving a resolution. So
universal across both time and space is this simple social
invention of triads that we can discover almost no society
that fails to employ it. And from its overwhelming appeal to
common sense stems the basic political legitimacy of courts
everywhere. In short, the triad for purposes of conflict resolution is the basic social logic of courts, a logic so compelling
that courts have become a universal political phenomenon.
The triad, however, involves a basic instability, paradox,
or dialectic that accounts for a large proportion of the scholarly quarrels over the nature of courts and the political difficulties that courts encounter in the real world. At the
moment the two disputants find their third, the social logic of
the court device is preeminent. A moment later, when the
third decides in favor of one of the two disputants, a shift
occurs from the triad to a structure that is perceived by the
loser as two against one. To the loser there is no social logic
in two against one. There is only the brute fact of being
outnumbered. A substantial portion of the total behavior of
36
See Henry P. Monaghan, Jurisdiction Stripping Circa 2020: What the Dialogue (Still) Has to Teach Us, 69 DUKE L.J. 1, 23–26 (2019); Henry Paul Monaghan,
On Avoiding Avoidance, Agenda Control, and Related Matters, 112 COLUM. L. REV.
665, 717–18 (2012).
37
See generally, RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 73–75 (7th ed. 2015) (contrasting the “dispute resolution” model of adjudication with the “law declaration” model, but
cautioning that the law declaration model, “sensibly construed, cannot be understood to license judicial review at the behest of any would-be litigant on the basis
on any hypothesized set of facts or indeed no facts whatsoever[ ]” and acknowledging that “[t]he Supreme Court has never explicitly rejected the dispute resolution
model.”).
38
SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 34 passim.
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courts in all societies can be analyzed in terms of attempts to
prevent the triad from breaking down into two against one.39

Shapiro’s functional insight serves as the starting point for
my analysis of legitimate adjudication. Put simply, if adjudication is to be perceived as legitimate, the adjudicator must seek
to resolve the dispute in such a way that the loser does not
believe he or she is outnumbered two to one. In Shapiro’s
words, “[t]he basic tension to be found in courts as conflict
resolvers lies in their need to persuade the parties that judges
and laws they have not chosen nonetheless constitute a genuine, neutral third.”40
B. Sources of Adjudicator Legitimacy
How do adjudicators establish and maintain a reputation
for neutrality, and hence legitimacy? A number of institutional
practices contribute to overcoming or at least diminishing the
two-against-one problem. Some are well known, and I mention
them briefly since they fall outside my main topic of concern,
which is decisional norms. Establishing the independence of
the adjudicator from either of the contesting parties is important.41 Prohibiting adjudicators from deciding cases in which
they have a financial or personal interest is important.42 Careful attention to fact finding is important, since the fact-finding
process will nearly always be perceived by the parties as having
an objective foundation in the world outside the courtroom.43
Giving reasons in support of judgments is important.44
39

Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 17.
41
Id. at 19 (“It is to counteract [the] perceptions of judges as part of a two
against one rather than a genuinely triadic structure that the prototype stresses
the ‘independence’ of the judge.”).
42
See 28 U.S.C. § 455(b)(4) (requiring judge or magistrate to disqualify himself if he “has a financial interest in the subject matter in controversy or in a party
to the proceeding”).
43
SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 34, at 43–49.
44
Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 VA. L. REV. 987, 1002 (2008)
(“When parties offer reasons for their claims in the form of legal arguments . . .
they can reasonably expect that judges will weigh those reasons and provide a
decision based on an evaluation of them. Decisions reached without regard to
reasons are not responsive to the underlying conflict between the parties.”) (footnote omitted); see also Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633,
656–59 (1995) (arguing that reason-giving is a commitment by the decision maker
to prioritize reliance and stability); David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 HARV. L. REV. 731, 737 (1987) (“A requirement that judges give reasons
for their decisions . . . serves a vital function in constraining the judiciary’s
exercise of power.”).
40
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Although the forgoing social practices are individually and
collectively important in establishing and maintaining the legitimacy of adjudication, I will concentrate on an additional feature critical to the legitimacy of adjudication, namely, the
invocation by the adjudicator of one or more objective decisional norms as a foundation for resolution of the conflict. This
is where my inquiry crosses paths with the contemporary debate about legitimate interpretation.
The need to resolve disputes with reference to some objective decisional norm follows from the central imperative of adjudication, which is to convince the loser that the outcome is
not simply the “brute fact” of being outnumbered two to one. If
the adjudicator can point to some proposition over which the
adjudicator has no control as the foundational norm that governs the resolution of the controversy, this will obviously increase the willingness of the loser to believe that the outcome is
a function of something other than the adjudicator’s preference
for the winner.
In terms of the types of norms that satisfy the requirement
of objectivity we find considerable variation across human societies over time and space. Modern societies tend to emphasize
that the adjudicator must resolve the dispute in a manner consistent with existing law. Existing law, on this understanding,
is regarded as having an objective and ascertainable content
independent of the personal preferences of the adjudicator.
But we know that other societies have invoked different sorts of
norms for resolving disputes in a manner independent of the
preferences of the adjudicator. Medieval societies used trial by
ordeal and trial by battle as ways of resolving disputes.45 Earlier societies used practices such as examining the entrails of
animals to resolve disputes.46 As should be obvious, social
practice again dictates what will be regarded as a permissible
in the way of an objective norm to serve as the foundation for
an adjudication. The relevant point, for present purposes, is
that nearly all forms of adjudication, if they are regarded as
legitimate, will invoke one or more norms as a basis for resolving the dispute that will be perceived by the disputing parties
45
See Paul R. Hyams, Trial by Ordeal: The Key to Proof in the Early Common
Law, in ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 90, 110–11 (Morris S. Arnold et al.
eds., 1981) (trial by ordeal); EDWARD J. WHITE, Trial by Battle in LEGAL ANTIQUITIES:
A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS UPON ANCIENT LAWS AND CUSTOMS 109, 109 (1913) (trial by
battle).
46
See Morris Jastrow, Jr., Hepatoscopy and Astrology in Babylonia and Assyria, 47 PROC. AM. PHIL. SOC’Y 646, 646 (1908).
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as having an objective basis independent of the preferences of
the adjudicator.
C. Losers as the Relevant Recognitional Community
Before considering what decisional norms are regarded as
legitimate for purposes of adjudication in the context of contemporary American social practice, it is important to identify
whose social practices are relevant in this regard. Hart was
somewhat unclear in specifying whose social practices count in
identifying the norms we regard as law. Sometimes he wrote of
public officials being the relevant reference group; sometimes
he referred more narrowly to courts.47 His successors have
divided over whether public officials or courts are the appropriate recognitional community.48
As should be obvious, the institutional actors with which I
am concerned are courts and other adjudicators, not other
public officials or members of the general public. In a departure from Hartian jurisprudence, however, I do not view the
matter as simply one in which courts proceed in accordance
with their own social practices. Instead, in keeping with Shapiro’s key insight that problem of legitimacy for adjudicators is
whether the loser regards the decision as legitimate, I will argue
that the relevant audience consists of the parties who present
their dispute for adjudication, not the adjudicators themselves.
To be sure, adjudicators will look to past practices of other
adjudicators for guidance in adopting decisional norms. But
the ultimate touchstone will always be what the parties—most
critically the loser—regard as legitimate. The loser will be more
inclined to accept the legitimacy of the adjudication if he or she
perceives that the decision (in addition to having the other
qualities previously mentioned) rests on decisional norms that
the loser recognizes as being legitimate. In this sense, the ultimate recognitional community is not the adjudicator but the
parties who submit their conflict to resolution by the
adjudicator.
Here I hasten to offer an important qualification: the parties’ views about the legitimacy of the process will be significantly influenced by the advice of their lawyers. In particular,
the decisional norms employed by the adjudicator are likely to
require some explication for nonlegally trained parties. On
47
Compare HART, supra note 15, at 111–17 (discussing rule of recognition
based on social practices of officials) with id. at 256 (grounding rule of recognition
in social practices of courts in the postscript).
48
Adler, supra note 17, at 723–26.
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other dimensions of the process, this is less true. With respect
to findings of fact, the parties will typically understand the
points of disagreement and will be keenly aware of how the
adjudicator resolves these disagreements. With respect to the
adjudicator’s choice of decisional norms, however, the parties
will typically be dependent on their lawyers in forming any
judgment about whether the adjudicator has adopted an objective norm, i.e. one that is not stacked against the losing party.
On this dimension—which is my focus of concern here—the
relevant recognitional community is the parties as advised by
their lawyers.
One could go further and say that, at least with respect to
the choice of decisional norms, the lawyers representing the
parties are the critical recognitional community.49 Consider
how the matter appears to the parties. The immediate question
may be whether to accept a plea bargain or offer of settlement.
The parties will seek the advice of their lawyers about the adjudicator’s likely view of the relevant decisional norms, perhaps
as foreshadowed by the adjudicator’s response to preliminary
motions. The parties will want to know if the adjudicator’s view
of the relevant decisional norms is amenable to change after a
more complete presentation of argument. If a final judgment is
entered, the question for the loser will be whether to file an
appeal. The loser will want to hear from her lawyer about
whether the adjudicator adopted one or more decisional norms
vulnerable to being overturned on appeal.
Critically, the function of the lawyers in the adjudication
process goes well beyond advice giving to the parties. The lawyers are also actively engaged in seeking to persuade the adjudicator about the decisional norms the adjudicator should
adopt for resolution of the dispute.50 They do so through filing
motions and briefs and in oral argument. Often the give-andtake between the lawyers will significantly narrow the range of
potential decisional norms presented for consideration. Most
adjudicators are too busy to go off in search of a set of norms
different than the ones presented by the lawyers.51 If, as usu49
See Kent Greenawalt, The Rule of Recognition and the Constitution, 85
MICH. L. REV. 621, 665 (1987) (observing that a lawyer advising a client about the
law will adopt “something very close to the sociologist’s approach” to identifying
the law).
50
FULLER, ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 109 (“A judge is one who decides disputes within an institutional framework assuring to the litigant a collaborative
role, which consists in the opportunity to state, prove, and argue his case.”).
51
Consider the occasional laments of Justices Scalia and Thomas that they
cannot resolve an issue in accordance with the original understanding of the
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ally happens, the adjudicator adopts norms that have been
presented by the lawyers, perhaps as qualified by objections
advanced by opposing lawyers, it is small wonder lawyers ordinarily advise their clients that the choice of decisional norms is
legitimate.
In a sense then, one can say that the adjudicator and the
lawyers for the parties constitute an “interpretive community”
or “coordinating convention” that collectively works to identify
the decisional norms that will be used to resolve the dispute.52
They will nearly always share a common educational background, having graduated from law school. There, they will
have absorbed certain conventions about the appropriate
norms to use in resolving disputes between adverse parties.
Their understanding of these norms will have been refined
through practice. Lawyers who specialize in appellate litigation
will be particularly attuned to the range and type of decisional
norms that the legal community regards as legitimate at any
moment in time.53
Constitution because the relevant material was not presented by the parties. See,
e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 169 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(declining to consider whether the enacted statute was a proper exercise of the
Commerce Clause because the question was not presented by the parties); 44
Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 517–18 (1996) (Scalia, J., concurring in part) (stating that he could not determine the scope of regulation of commercial speech when the Constitution was adopted because the parties and their
amici did not address the point).
52
See STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE
PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 95–98 (1989) (arguing that the
practice of law should be understood as a profession that constitutes an interpretive community); Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and Convention at the Foundations of Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982) (explicating the rule of recognition in
terms of coordinating conventions shared by courts, the parties, and their lawyers). See also Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177, 187 (1985)
(“I picture the judge trying to choose, in a self-conscious and reflective manner,
between the arguments of the contending lawyers, and in that process thinking
about and perhaps discussing (with colleagues and clerks) the rules and norms of
the profession—What do they imply for the case at hand?”).
53
One study, which tested the ability of a panel of experts to predict the
outcome of future Supreme Court decisions, found that legal academics had a
53% success rate in predicting outcomes whereas experienced Supreme Court
advocates predicted correctly 92% of the time. Theodore W. Ruger et al., The
Supreme Court Forecasting Project: Legal and Political Science Approaches to Predicting Supreme Court Decisionmaking, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1150, 1177–88 (2004).
Although the number of experienced advocates in the study was too small to be
statistically significant, this suggests that active participants in adjudication may
have a superior sense of existing decisional norms. Id. The same study found that
a statistical model was more accurate in predicting outcomes of Supreme Court
decisions than was the panel of experts, which included both the legal academics
and the experienced Supreme Court advocates. Id. at 1171. Since the “experts”
consisted primarily of legal academics, this result does not necessarily contradict
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D. The Enforcement Constraint
An objection to the foregoing might be that the views of the
parties, as advised by their lawyers, provide little constraint on
adjudicators because adjudicators are confident that any final
decision they reach will be enforced against the losing party.
Losers acquiesce in the results of adjudications, on this view,
because they are advised by their lawyers that the judgment
will be enforced, if need be by force in the form of seizure of
assets or jail time for contempt. The threat of coercive enforcement action, and not legitimacy, explains the high rates of
voluntary compliance with final judgments.54
The objection is consistent with classical legal positivism,
which characterized law as an order backed by the threat of
sanctions.55 But modern research indicates that obedience to
law is fostered more by belief in its legitimacy than by the
threat of sanctions.56 The same is probably true of compliance
with judgments. The ultimate reason why judgments are routinely obeyed is that the parties to adjudicated disputes, over
time, have concluded that the decisional norms adopted by
adjudicators are generally legitimate. It is not necessary that
every judgment be regarded as legitimate. Especially for tribunals like the Supreme Court, which have amassed a very large
storehouse of legitimacy over a long period of time, it is possible
to “expend” some of this accumulated capital in reaching occathe finding that active participants may have a superior sense of existing judicial
norms. Id. at 1168.
54
Data on rates of voluntary compliance are hard to come by, which in itself
indicates that noncompliance is not seen as a pressing issue. Justice Department
statistics indicate that contempt citations to enforce federal court orders are quite
rare—less than 0.2% of all criminal referrals handled by the Department (over half
of which were not prosecuted). Mark Motivans, Federal Justice Statistics, 2014
Statistical Tables, U.S. DEP’T JUST. BUREAU JUST. STAT. 11 tbl.2.2 (Mar. 2017),
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fjs14st.pdf [https://perma.cc/VW4NEHPG] (The table combines contempt referrals with referrals for “perjury” and
“intimidation,” and is thus overinclusive.). Looking at the published budget of
Marshals Service, it is difficult to determine what portion is devoted to executing
court orders. Whatever it is, it is too small to warrant a separate line in the Office
of Management and Budget’s annual budgetary breakdown. The major budgetary
categories for the Marshals Service are “judicial and courthouse security,” “fugitive apprehension,” “prisoner security and transportation, “protection of witnesses,” and “tactical operations.” OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, APPENDIX: BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 692
(2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/omb/budget/
fy2018/appendix.pdf [https://perma.cc/WJM7-C2XU].
55
See JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 151 (1995)
(“The binding virtue of a law lies in the sanction annexed to it.”).
56
See generally, TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 58–59 (2006). (finding that compliance with the law is strongly influenced by perceptions of
legitimacy).
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sional decisions that the loser regards as highly dubious.57
Nevertheless, widespread compliance with judgments ultimately depends on belief that the decisional norms employed
by the adjudicator are nearly always legitimate.
The place to start in considering the relevance of enforcement of judgments is Alexander Hamilton’s Federalist Paper
No. 78. In this essay, Hamilton was anxious to reassure those
skeptical about the proposed Constitution that they had nothing to fear from the creation of a federal judiciary.58 He wrote
that the judiciary would be the “least dangerous” of the three
branches, because it would have “no influence over either the
sword or the purse.”59 Indeed, the courts “must ultimately
depend upon the aid of the executive arm” for the enforcement
of their judgments. Consequently, he wrote, the courts would
exercise “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment . . . .”
60

What was Hamilton driving at? He implied, but did not
expressly state, that judicial judgments based on “will” rather
than “judgment” would be met with resistance from the executive.61 This in turn implied that judges would have a powerful
incentive to ground their decisions in “judgment”—in other
57
Political scientists have hypothesized that the Court enjoys high “diffuse”
support even if “specific” support for particular decisions is low. See James L.
Gibson & Michael J. Nelson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court: Conventional Wisdom and Recent Challenges Thereto, 10 ANN. REV. LAW & SOC. SCI. 201,
206 (2014). Thus, although many thought the decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S.
98 (2000), would destroy the Court’s legitimacy, this did not happen. See James
L. Gibson, The Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court in a Polarized Polity, 4 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 507, 533 (2007). This does not mean that exposure to a
long sequence of decisions that appear to be illegitimate would not undermine the
standing of the Court. Evidence from opinion surveys indicates that support for
the Court declines when its decisions are presented as being driven by the political preferences of the Justices. See infra note 199. This is a plausible explanation
for the precipitous decline in public approval of the way the Court is “doing its
job,” falling from 74% in a 2001 Gallup to 45% in 2015. FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY supra note 16, at 156.
58
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); see also THE FEDERALIST NO.
81 (Alexander Hamilton) (making the same point more briefly).
59
THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 58.
60
Id.
61
See Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power
to Say What the Law Is, 83 GEO. L.J. 217, 251–52 (1994) (interpreting Hamilton as
making such an argument); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Fair and Impartial Adjudication, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV. 897, 900 (2019) (“[I]f adjudicators know they are
ultimately dependent on the political branches for enforcement of their judgments, they will not stray very far, certainly not on a consistent basis, from settled
expectations about the decisional norms that they must use in assessing the
conduct of the parties that come before them.”).
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words, to rule in a fashion regarded by the parties as
legitimate.
As things turned out, the executive was not given discretion to decline to enforce individual judgments, “willful” or not.
Shortly after Hamilton highlighted the weakness of federal
courts in an effort to secure ratification of the Constitution, a
Congress dominated by the Federalist Party enacted, as part of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, a statute creating the U.S. Marshals
Service and requiring it to enforce all “lawful precepts” issued
by federal judges.62 With variations in language, this statutory
obligation has remained on the books ever since.63 On rare
occasions, Presidents or their lawyers have asserted that they
might defy a judicial judgment.64 But nearly all commentators
regard these episodes as outliers. The dominant position of
Presidents and their lawyers has been that the executive is
duty bound to enforce all final federal court judgments.65 This
duty is grounded in a statute and the internal executive norm
that has grown up around it. State court orders, which are
generally enforced by county sheriffs’ offices, are governed by a
similar understanding.
This does not mean that concerns about compliance have
disappeared. A recent study by Nicholas Parrillo of cases in
which federal agencies have failed to comply with judicial judgments is illuminating in this regard. Parrillo finds that coercive
sanctions (monetary penalties, jail time for officials, or fines of
62
For the original enactment, see Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 27, 1 Stat.
73, 87 (providing for the appointment of a marshal in each federal judicial district,
and stipulating that the marshal should “execute throughout the district, all
lawful precepts directed to him, and issued under the authority of the United
States . . . .”).
63
See 28 U.S.C. § 566(a) (2018) (“It is the primary role and mission of the
United States Marshals Service to provide for the security and to obey, execute,
and enforce all orders of the United States District Courts, the United States
Courts of Appeals, the Court of International Trade, and the United States Tax
Court, as provided by law.”).
64
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Executive Power and the Political Constitution,
2007 UTAH L. REV. 1, 22 (discussing a comment made by President Nixon’s lawyer
at oral argument in the tapes case) [hereinafter Fallon, Jr., Executive Power];
Paulsen, supra note 61, at 259–60 n.159 (discussing President Andrew Jackson’s
alleged refusal to enforce the Supreme Court’s judgment about state interference
with the Cherokee).
65
See William Baude, The Judgment Power, 96 GEO. L.J. 1807, 1821–26
(2008) (and sources cited). The most prominent dissenting voice is Michael Paulsen. See Paulsen, supra note 61, at 294–303. The duty of the executive to comply
with judicial judgments, including those about the meaning of the Constitution, is
longstanding. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, LAW AND JUDICIAL DUTY 543 (2008) (noting
that it is “difficult to locate constitutional cases from the first fifteen years after
Independence in which a party resisted the authority of a court to give judgment”).
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officials) are almost never imposed on noncompliant agencies.
In the rare case in which sanctions are imposed, the sanctioning court typically backs down after further rounds of litigation
or the court is reversed on appeal, usually on case specific
grounds.66 One plausible explanation for this pattern of judicial behavior is that courts suffer from Hamiltonian anxiety
about a showdown with the executive, given the dependence of
courts on the executive for enforcement of their judgments. In
effect, when executive agencies engage courts in a game of
“chicken,” the courts swerve.67 Another explanation might be
that administrative defiance of judicial judgments is extremely
rare, precisely because agencies regard most judicial judgments as legitimate. In the unusual case where the court encounters executive resistance, the sanctioning court (or its
appeals court) may interpret the defiance as a signal that the
executive has reasonable grounds for questioning the legitimacy of the court’s judgment. This signal causes the judiciary
to reconsider its order. As Parrillo observes, “if a judge issues
an order so aggressive or rigid as to invite official disobedience,
the judge risks undermining the self-reinforcing perception
that compliance is the norm.”68
Congress can also get into the act when it is unhappy with
particular judgments entered by federal courts. After the Ninth
Circuit held that the inclusion of the phrase “under God” in the
Pledge of Allegiance was unconstitutional,69 and the Eleventh
Circuit held that a granite monument to the Ten Commandments in the Alabama State Judicial Building had to be removed,70 the House of Representatives passed two
appropriations riders prohibiting the Marshals Service from
spending any money to enforce these judgments. Both riders
66
Nicholas R. Parrillo, The Endgame of Administrative Law: Governmental
Disobedience and the Judicial Contempt Power, 131 HARV. L. REV. 685, 712–35,
745–46, 761 (2018).
67
See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT H. GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 44 (1994) (explaining the game of chicken).
68
Parrillo, supra note 66, at 790. One study of institutional reform litigation
notes that prison officials in Texas resisted complying with court-ordered prison
reform because they regarded the orders as “illegitimate.” Sheldon Ekland-Olson
& Steve J. Martin, Organizational Compliance with Court-Ordered Reform, 22 L. &
SOC’Y REV. 359, 371 (1988).
69
Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 612 (9th Cir. 2002).
70
Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282, 1297 (11th Cir. 2003). Alabama Chief
Justice Roy Moore refused to comply with the judgment, which led to his suspension by the other Justices on the court. Ten Commandments Judge Removed from
Office, S. POVERTY L. CENTER (Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.splcenter.org/news/
2003/11/13/ten-commandments-judge-removed-office [https://perma.cc/
8RZ4-WEEQ].
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were deleted by the Conference Committee, as was a similar
rider approved by the House several years later involving a
judgment about a Ten Commandments monument in Indiana.71 Whether such targeted riders are constitutional is untested. Nevertheless, they underscore the dependence of the
courts on the support of the political branches for enforcement
of judgments.
Concern about compliance with judgments is not the end
of the matter, however. Although courts have little reason to
worry that their judgments will be enforced (except in rare
cases), it is much less certain that the decisional rules courts
espouse in support of their judgments will be followed in the
future.72 The legal commentary is divided on the question
whether nonparties have a duty to comply with the legal rationales adopted by courts in support of their judgments.73
Whether or not such a duty exists, there are many examples in
recent history of Supreme Court decisions being ignored, protested, and occasionally defied by officials other than those
immediately subject to a judgment.74 There is also extensive
evidence that courts adjust the remedies they adopt for legal
violations in order to maximize the prospect of compliance, by
parties and nonparties alike.75 Finally, there is the famous
insight of Alexander Bickel that the Court will frequently ap71
These episodes are reviewed in Jennifer Mason McAward, Congress’s
Power to Block Enforcement of Federal Court Orders, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1319,
1323–26 (2008).
72
As Alexander Bickel wrote:
“[N]o one is under any legal obligation to carry out a rule of constitutional law announced by the Supreme Court until someone else has
conducted a successful litigation and obtained a decree directing
him to do so. Any rule of constitutional law not put into effect
voluntarily by officials and other persons who acquiesce in it, or not
taken up by legislation and made more effective by administrative or
noncoercive means—any such rule is not in our system an effective
rule of law.”
Alexander M. Bickel, The Morality of Consent 111 (1975).
73
My view is that judicial opinions should be regarded as predictive of future
judicial judgments, but not legally binding on nonparties. See Merrill, supra note
25; accord, Fallon, Jr., Executive Power, supra note 64, at 12; Saikrishna Prakash
& John Yoo, Against Interpretive Supremacy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1539, 1560–64
(2005). For the contrary view, see Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On
Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1997).
74
For an account of popular and political resistance to rulings on desegregation, school prayer, criminal procedure, and other matters, see generally BARRY
FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION 237–79 (2009).
75
See Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialism and Remedial Equilibration, 99
COLUM. L. REV. 857, 884–89 (1999) (summarizing various ways the Court has
modified remedies to enhance enforcement).
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proach controversial issues tentatively, through jurisdictional
or justiciability rulings, before finally ruling on the merits.76
One explanation for this pattern of behavior is that the Court
wants to test the degree of potential opposition to a controversial ruling, including the likelihood of noncompliance.77
In any event, it is incorrect to assume that the strong norm
of executive enforcement of judgments means that adjudicators are unconcerned with whether losers regard their judgments as legitimate. The executive norm very likely owes its
existence to the perception that judicial judgments are nearly
always legitimate. And judicial judgments may nearly always
be legitimate, in significant part, because courts and other adjudicators are aware that they are dependent on the executive
(and the legislature, which funds the executive) for the efficacy
of their judgments.78
In short, when I speak of legitimate decisional norms, I
refer to norms that the loser’s lawyer advises are broadly acceptable within the legal community. The loser may sincerely
believe that the judgment is wrong (probably more often than
not does believe this). But the loser will nonetheless acquiesce
in the judgment if the loser is advised by her lawyer that the
decisional norms adopted by the adjudicator are legitimate. In
modern societies, this means the decisional norms are recognized to be grounded in law. It is in an effort to identify what it
means for a decisional norm to be grounded in law that I now
turn.
II
LEGITIMATE DECISIONAL NORMS
The ultimate criterion for identifying the types of decisional
norms that the parties to an adjudication regard as legitimate
is simple and easy to state: a category of norms will be regarded
as legitimate if it conforms to the expectations of the parties, as
advised by their lawyers. This follows in a straightforward
fashion from the understanding of legitimacy as grounded in
social practice—in this case, the social practice of the parties
who have submitted their disputes to adjudication, as advised
76
ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE
BAR OF POLITICS (1962) [hereinafter BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS].
77
See id. at 251; see also id. at 147–49, 155–56 (making the point in the
context of a challenge to anti-contraceptive legislation).
78
Cf. David S. Law, Generic Constitutional Law, 89 MINN. L. REV. 652, 679
(2005) (concluding that “[i]n practical terms,” judicial legitimacy means “the ability of courts to secure compliance with their decisions, absent the powers of the
purse or the sword.”).
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by their lawyers. The social practice of lawyers will include a
complex of expectations about what types of decisional norms
are appropriate to be used in adjudication. These understandings will differ from one society to another and from one era to
another. But at any particular point in place and time they will
be reasonably settled and will enjoy a fair degree of consensus
among those lawyers who are actively engaged in litigation. As
my colleague Philip Bobbitt has written, “[t]here is a legal grammar that we all share and that we have all mastered prior to our
being able to ask what the reasons are for a court having power
to [act].”79
The fact that the set of legitimate decisional norms is generally stable does not mean that change does not take place
over time—or that future expansion or contraction in the set of
norms will not occur. As Frederick Schauer has pointed out,
new sources of law can emerge at the “boundaries of law” that
are, at least initially, controversial.80 He cites as an example
the question whether non-U.S. court decisions, statutes, and
constitutional provisions should be consulted in determining
the meaning of open-ended provisions of U.S. law, such as the
guarantee of due process and the prohibition on the use of
cruel and unusual punishments.81 Some Justices regard such
foreign sources as legitimate; others do not.82 One can imagine
the legitimacy of this form of argument tipping one way or the
other in the future.
Although there will be a broad consensus at any time
about the types of norms that can be called upon to resolve an
adjudication, the content of these norms may be—and often
is—disputed. Thus, it is critical to distinguish between types
or categories of decisional norms and the content of those
79
PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION 6 (1982)
[hereinafter BOBBITT, FATE].
80
See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, Law’s Boundaries, 130 HARV. L. REV. 2434,
2435–36 (2017) (exploring the creation of law through the expansion of “law’s
boundaries”).
81
Id. at 2456–57.
82
Compare Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 572–73 (2003) (invoking support from British and European sources in invalidating sodomy statute), with id.
at 598 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (condemning reliance on these sources); compare
also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830–31 (1988) (listing countries that
have abolished the death penalty for juveniles), with id. at 868–69 n.4 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (objecting to references to foreign law). Some scholars argue for nonconclusive reliance on foreign sources; others question it. See generally Vicki C.
Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119
HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005) (arguing for nonconclusive reliance on foreign sources);
Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV.
148 (2005) (questioning even nonconclusive reliance).
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norms. To make this concrete, suppose that one category of
norm regarded as legitimate is following precedent previously
established by the relevant adjudicative tribunal. The lawyers
advising the parties will likely have no quarrel about this general proposition. But they may disagree sharply about which of
two conflicting precedents is the appropriate authority to
adopt, or they may agree about the relevant precedent but
disagree about how it should be interpreted.83 These sorts of
disagreements are to be expected. Indeed, they are the source
of much of the adjudication that results in published opinions
at the appellate level. My concern here is not with the particular content of norms but with identifying the categories of
norms that are accepted as legitimate by lawyers engaged in
contemporary American practice before adjudicative tribunals.
What types of decisional norms will conform to the expectations of lawyers engaged in litigation in various forums in
contemporary American society? I argue that five such categories exist. Three I describe as robust, meaning that they will be
regarded as legitimate without regard to their content. Two I
regard as qualified, meaning that they will be regarded as legitimate only when there is a very high degree of consensus about
the content of the norm. The robust norms consist of arguments based on faithful agent interpretation of a controlling
text, precedent, and settled practice. The qualified norms consist of arguments based on moral principles and social welfare.
A brief word of explanation about each before considering some
evidence in support of my typology of norms, and how the
norms interact in the process of justifying the outcome of adjudicated disputes.84

83
See, e.g., Lucia v. SEC, 138 S. Ct. 2044, 2053–54 (2018) (identifying a key
precedent and interpreting it one way); id. at 2066–67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(agreeing that the precedent is key but offering a different interpretation of it).
84
Arguments from multiple modalities of legitimacy are often criticized as
lacking a “metaprinciple” to resolve conflicts among the modalities or the problem
of incommensurability in determining their respective weight. See Michael C.
Dorf, Integrating Normative and Descriptive Constitutional Theory: The Case of
Original Meaning, 85 GEO. L.J. 1765, 1788–94 (1997). But if the criterion of
legitimacy is existing social practice of the parties to adjudication, as informed by
their lawyers, then the expectations of the parties constitute the relevant
metaprinciple. The demand for something else shifts the foundation of legitimacy
from social practice to a different type of legitimacy theory, such as social contract
theory or moral theory.
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A. Five Types of Decisional Norms
Contemporary American legal practice recognizes five types
of decisional norms that are regarded as legitimate. 85
1. Faithful Agent Arguments
The first type of robust decisional norm consists of what I
will call faithful agent arguments. These are arguments to the
effect that the controversy should be resolved in accordance
with the instructions of the enacting body that authored an
authoritative text that governs the controversy in question.
American legal practice recognizes the principle of popular
sovereignty—the proposition that the people, collectively, are
the ultimate source of governmental authority.86 Thus, the
Constitution, through the process of ratification of the original
document and its amendments, is viewed as having secured
the consent of the people as the supreme law of the land. Similar arguments pertain to state constitutions. Each of these
constitutions, federal and state, creates a legislature elected by
the people of the respective jurisdictions, whose function is to
enact laws that govern persons living within their respective
jurisdictions. Provided such legislated enactments are consistent with the relevant constitution, they are understood as
commands having secured the (constructive) consent of all persons within the relevant jurisdiction, including adjudicators.
The adjudicator respects the sovereignty of the enacting body
only by interpreting its instructions to mean what the enacting
body intended them to mean.87
Faithful agent arguments are thus grounded in the proposition that the adjudicator is subject to a duty to carry out
the will of the people and their elected representatives as ex85
In a previous essay, I offered a three-part taxonomy of decisional arguments: faithful agent, integrative, and welfarist arguments. Thomas W. Merrill,
Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
1565, 1566–72 (2010) [hereinafter Merrill, Interpretation]. I did not there expressly distinguish arguments between precedent and settled practice as different
forms of integrative interpretation (as I do here), and I lumped moral and social
welfare arguments together under the heading of welfarist interpretation. Id. at
1572.
86
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 7 (1980) (“[W]hatever the explanation, and granting the qualifications, rule
in accord with the consent of a majority of those governed is the core of the
American governmental system.”).
87
See Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 258 (Robert P. George ed., 1996) (“It makes no sense to
give any person or body lawmaking power unless it is assumed that the law they
make is the law they intended to make.”).
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pressed in duly ratified constitutions and enacted legislation.
This is a straightforward principal/agent mode of argument.
The people, and derivatively their elected representatives, are
the principal. The adjudicator is the agent. The adjudicator,
like all other persons within the relevant jurisdiction, is bound
by the constitution and the enacted laws that have been
promulgated by the principal. If lawyers can convince the adjudicator that the principal has issued an instruction that
bears on the controversy, the adjudicator is required to carry
out that instruction as the faithful agent of the principal.
There is a very broad consensus among American lawyers
(and in all liberal democracies) that faithful agent arguments
are legitimate decisional norms for adjudication.88 Everyone
agrees that the text of the Constitution and statutes that have
been duly enacted in the manner set forth in the Constitution
are legally binding on adjudicators, as they are on everyone
else in the policy.89 Thus, insofar as there is agreement that a
particular enacted law has a “plain,” “clear,” or “unambiguous”
meaning, it supplies a binding norm for resolving the adjudication.90 This is the powerful core of faithful agent arguments: it
is always legitimate to resolve a contested adjudication in accordance with the undisputed meaning of a binding form of
enacted law.
There is, of course, less consensus about how to determine
the meaning of an enacted law when it is not plain, clear, or
unambiguous. Legal commentators operating in the faithful
agent tradition vigorously debate whether it is appropriate to
determine the instructions contained in enacted law by reference to the law’s purpose, and if so, at what level of generality.
And commentators (and some judges) vigorously debate
whether the legislative history of an enactment should be consulted in trying to discern the meaning of an uncertain law. It
88
See JOHN F. MANNING & MATHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 24 (3d ed. 2017) (postulating that textualism, intentionalism
and purposivism are each “grounded in the principle of legislative supremacy,
which encapsulates the related ideas that in the U.S. constitutional system, acts
of Congress enjoy primacy as long as they remain within constitutional bounds,
and that judges must act as Congress’s faithful agents.”).
89
The Supremacy Clause of the Constitution says as much: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof
. . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land . . . .” U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also
FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 98 (“I know of no case in which the
Justices have ever suggested that they could reach a decision contrary to the
Constitution’s requirements.”).
90
See BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 35–58 (affirming the binding nature of formal constitutional rules); cf. STRAUSS, supra note 11, at 7.
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is not clear, however, that these debates have significantly affected the general legal culture. Evidence suggests that lower
courts and lawyers continue to invoke arguments from purpose
and legislative history, even if these techniques of faithful agent
interpretation have been condemned by self-proclaimed custodians of originalism and textualism.91 Practicing lawyers and
judges clearly accept the legitimacy of faithful agent arguments
but by and large remain eclectic about how those arguments
are pursued. Thus, legal practitioners will sometimes stress
dictionary definitions of the words in the text, sometimes will
invoke the purpose of the enactment (perhaps with reference to
its structure), and sometimes will delve into legislative
history.92
The important point is that even if questions are earnestly
debated in academic circles about the proper method of implementing the faithful agent decisional norm, the central proposition that the adjudicator must act as the faithful agent of
the enacting body enjoys a very high degree of consensus in our
legal culture. Faithful agent arguments thus conform to the
general criterion for legitimate decisional norms in adjudication: they comport with the expectations of the lawyers who
represent and advise the parties in adjudication.
2. Arguments from Precedent
The second robust type of decisional norm consists of arguments from precedent. Arguments from precedent are ubiq91
See Abbe R. Gluck & Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation on the
Bench: A Survey of Forty-Two Judges on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 131 HARV.
L. REV. 1298, 1324–27 (2018).
92
American constitutional law is particularly subject to a variety of understandings about the “meaning” of the text, some of which bear no resemblance to
the shared understanding of the text at the time it was ratified. See generally
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235 (2015) (arguing that
different constitutional provisions have different temporal referents). For example, in Bolling v. Sharp, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954), the Court interpreted the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment as incorporating the equal protection
mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was in turn interpreted as barring
segregation in public schools. There was no suggestion that “due process of law”
had this meaning in 1791, when the Fifth Amendment was adopted. It is nevertheless striking that the Court nearly always cites some clause in the Constitution
in support of its decisions. An exception are its decisions recognizing a broad
principle of state sovereign immunity that goes beyond the text of the Eleventh
Amendment. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54–55
(1996). But these decisions have been justified on the ground that such an
understanding was implicitly assumed by the framers when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 713–24 (1999). Thus, they too
fall within the scope of the faithful agent argument.
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uitous in any form of organized human activity.93 “This is the
way we have done it in the past” is a decisional shortcut used
all the time, for the simple reason that it would be impossible to
rethink every step in every collective decisional process every
time it comes up.94 If you doubt this, consider how matters are
resolved at faculty meetings, or at any type of meeting by a
board of directors or trustees. Precedent following is especially
entrenched in American legal culture, given the prominence
accorded to the common law in the first-year curriculum in law
schools and the dominance of the case method of instruction
even in courses about constitutional law and legislation. Unsurprisingly, then, arguments from precedent form a second
robust norm used by adjudicators in resolving disputes.95
Historically, arguments from precedent have been closely
associated with private law, where common law has played a
prominent role. In recent decades, however, private law has
become increasingly dominated by statutes, including uniform
laws, model state laws, and federal and state regulatory enactments. Meanwhile, amendments to the Constitution and to
many framework statutes have become increasingly difficult to
obtain. With the “statutorification” of private law96 and
gridlock afflicting public law, arguments from precedent have
receded in private law and have surged to the fore in public law.
This is especially pronounced in federal constitutional law,
where nearly every contested case is resolved by following, distinguishing, or qualifying existing precedent.97 David Strauss
93
See Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 572 (1987) (“Reliance on precedent is part of life in general.”).
94
See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 96 (2010)
[originally published 1921] (“[T]he labor of judges would be increased almost to
the breaking point if every past decision could be reopened in every case . . . .”).
95
See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Constitutional Precedent Viewed Through the
Lens of Hartian Positivist Jurisprudence, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1107, 1129–30 (2008)
[hereinafter Fallon, Constitutional Precedent] (“So far as I am aware, no Justice up
through and including those currently sitting has persistently questioned the
legitimacy of stare decisis or failed to apply it in some cases.”).
96
See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982).
97
See, e.g., Ethan Bueno de Mesquita & Matthew Stephenson, Informative
Precedent and Intrajudicial Communication, 96 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 755, 764 (2002)
(noting that “arguments from precedent vastly outnumber all other kinds of arguments in attorneys’ written briefs, the Court’s written opinions, and the [J]ustices’
arguments in conference discussions.”); see also Jack Knight & Lee Epstein, The
Norm of Stare Decisis, 40 AM. J. POL. SCI. 1018, 1025, 1030 (1996) (providing
empirical data). When the foundational legal authority is some form of enacted
law, as opposed to common law, the relevant precedents are those that have
resolved how the text in question (or a similar text) has been interpreted in the
past. Nevertheless, the conventions that govern the use of precedent in resolving
interpretational questions are closely similar to, and appear to have been borrowed from, those originally developed in the common law context.
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has persuasively argued that precedent has almost entirely
displaced original meaning argument in construing the federal
Constitution, the main body of which is now 230 years old.98
Arguments from precedent are also increasingly prevalent in
cases governed by statute, especially where the statute has
been around for a long time and has been frequently litigated.
In general, the older the text, and the more frequently it has
been interpreted in the past, the greater the likelihood that we
will find legal argumentation based on precedent, rather than
interpretation of the instructions of the enacting body. Public
law, and especially constitutional law, has become the new
common law.
The theoretical literature on precedent following is relatively thin compared to the extensive literature on faithful
agent interpretation. This is unfortunate, given the prominent
role that precedent plays in modern American public law. One
proposition about precedent, however, enjoys general consensus: if a controlling precedent is perceived to be indistinguishable from the case at hand, that precedent must be followed
unless there is a “special justification” for overruling it.99 This
is analogous to the proposition that the adjudicator is obliged
to enforce an enacted law whose meaning is “plain.” Admittedly, lawyers and adjudicators show considerable ingenuity in
arguing that precedents either are or are not distinguishable.100 Precedent by its nature has an accordion-like quality,
allowing it to be either broadly or narrowly characterized in
later adjudications.101 And if no precedent is directly on point,
lawyers and adjudicators are free to argue that other precedents either should or should not be extended by analogy.
Considered more abstractly, lawyers and adjudicators argue
that precedents reflect embedded rules, and the hypothesized

98

STRAUSS, supra note 11.
See, e.g., Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401, 2404 (2015). The
percentage of precedents that are overruled, although not negligible, is actually
quite small. A recent empirical study puts it at 3%–4% of all Supreme Court
precedent. Lee Epstein et al., The Decision to Depart (or Not) from Constitutional
Precedent: An Empirical Study of the Roberts Court, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1115, 1141
(2015). The study further finds that there is no appreciable difference between
statutory and constitutional precedent in this regard, contrary to the conventional
wisdom that stare decisis is weaker in constitutional cases. Id.
100
See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 1–2 (1949) (developing the point that the following court determines the meaning of the precedent
court, giving the system of precedent considerable room for evolution).
101
See Shapiro, supra note 44, at 734.
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rules can be characterized in different ways.102 Considerable
ingenuity is on display in arguing for broader or narrower characterizations of the embedded rule.
The legal conventions that govern arguments from precedent defy easy formulation, and are learned by lawyers and
adjudicators through emulation of what other adjudicators do.
At any given point in the evolution of the legal culture, there
will be limits on what is regarded as acceptable in the way of
using precedent, although these limits will be hard to define.103
In the normative section of the Article, I will criticize a form of
precedential argument that appears to be taking hold in the
Supreme Court, which I call Scrabble Board precedentialism.
The important point for present purposes is that there is a
broad consensus in our legal culture that indistinguishable
precedents must be followed unless overruled and that arguments by analogy from precedent are a legitimate source of
decisional norms in adjudication. Arguments from precedent
thus comport with the expectations of the lawyers who represent parties in adjudications and conform to the general
criterion for legitimate decisional norms.
3. Arguments from Settled Practice
My third type of robust decisional norm is argument from
settled practice. Arguments from settled practice are not always identified as such but are encountered quite frequently.
They include the settled practices of courts, of other branches
of government, and of the institutions of society more generally.
Once we identify them as a discrete category of argument, we
can see that they enjoy widespread support and thus qualify as
a robust.
Settled practice plays a large role in constitutional law, far
more than is commonly acknowledged. The very practice of
102
See Larry Alexander, Constrained by Precedent, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989)
(arguing that the constraining force of precedent comes from rules embedded in
decisions justifying outcomes).
103
Consider Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, a case involving
surface subsidence from mining of bituminous coal, where the majority declined
to follow a precedent (from the same state, Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393
(1922)) involving surface subsidence from mining anthracite coal. 480 U.S. 470,
474 (1987). The majority did not argue that the earlier decisions was distinguishable from the present one because it involved mining anthracite rather than
bituminous coal—that would have been regarded as silly given that subsurface
mining in both cases posed similar risks of surface subsidence. Instead, the
majority argued that the doctrinal framework had changed from that applied in
the earlier decision. Id. at 485. The dissent regarded the factual similarity to be
controlling. Id. at 507 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
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judicial review is not mentioned in the constitutional text. It is
commonly justified by citation to precedent—Marbury v.
Madison104—but the adequacy of the argument for judicial review set forth in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion has long been
questioned.105 The strongest justification, as Charles Black
wrote, rests on “the visible, active, and long-continued acquiescence of Congress in the Court’s performance of this function.”106 In other words, judicial review is constitutional
because it is part of settled practice.
Settled practice appears in many other guises in constitutional law. Separation of powers disputes are often resolved by
invoking the shared understandings of the political
branches107 and has recently been invoked in the voting rights
context.108 Even general societal practices often count in constitutional law, as under the Fourth Amendment, with its invocation of reasonable expectations of privacy109 and in
substantive due process cases that rely on practices “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”110 Michael

104

Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
See, e.g., BICKEL, LEAST DANGEROUS, supra note 76, at 2–14 (noting that
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion addresses the easy question whether the Constitution is binding law but ignores the hard question whether the courts are entitled
to exercise independent judgment in its interpretation); William W. Van Alstyne, A
Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 Duke L.J. 1, 6–33 (discussing a number of questionable aspects of the decision).
106
CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 71
(1969).
107
See Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 433–35 (2012) (interbranch consensus);
Aziz Z. Huq, The Negotiated Structural Constitution, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1595,
1620–31 (2014) (similar); David E. Pozen, Self Help and the Separation of Powers,
124 YALE L.J. 2, 34–39 (2014) (discussing a variety of separation of powers conventions). To cite a recent example, in NLRB v. Noel Canning, 132 S. Ct. 2550,
2567 (2014), the Court interpreted the Recess Appointments Clause to allow
presidents to make temporary appointments even when a vacancy exists before
the Senate goes into recess, relying in significant part on an unbroken practice
going back seventy five years.
108
Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1129 (2016) (relying in significant part
on settled practice in interpreting “eligible voters” for voting rights purposes).
109
Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2215–16 (2018); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
110
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 703, 721 (1977) (citing Moore v. City
of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977) (plurality opinion)). The Court of
course has been inconsistent in this regard, invoking settled practice to reject a
constitutional right to state-assisted suicide, Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 706, but
ignoring settled practice in creating a right to abortion and same-sex marriage.
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2596–97 (2015); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 116 (1973).
105
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Gerhardt has collected a number of other examples, which he
calls “nonjudicial precedent.”111
Invocation of settled practice as a decisional norm is hardly
limited to constitutional law. It plays a large role in the common law, where it is usually referred to as “custom.” Blackstone argued that the common law originated in the general
customs of the realm which have been followed from time immemorial.112 Whether or not this is generally true, there is no
doubt that the very idea of a common law, based on courts
following their own prior decisions, is itself grounded on nothing more than settled practice. “[T]his rule was never ‘made’ by
any explicit enactment; it is a part of the customary rules governing the actions of courts.”113 With respect to the content of
the common law, Melvin Eisenberg has argued that usages or
“experiential propositions” have always been a factor in shaping its development. A usage can take on a normative aspect,
he argues, when it “generates an expectation that it will
continue.”114
Perhaps the most widely referenced types of argument from
settled practice are canons of interpretation. Many of these can
be characterized as “linguistic” canons (like expressio
unius),115 and as such can be justified as part of the package of
interpretational tools that fall under the faithful agent rubric.
Other canons (such as the doctrine of lenity) can be justified as
devices for implementing particular constitutional norms and
thus can also be assimilated to faithful agent argument. Yet
there remains a residual set of canons that can be justified only
111
MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT 111–46 (2008) (collecting
examples). As in the case of precedent, arguments from settled practice come in
different versions. One version, which is relatively restrictive, would limit the use
of settled practice to situations in which the meaning of the text of the Constitution is unclear, multiple branches of government have deliberated about the correct answer, and both the branches and the general public have acquiesced in
this meaning. See William Baude, Constitutional Liquidation, 71 STAN. L. REV. 1
(2019) (developing this conception). Another and weaker form would simply require a longstanding practice that has been allowed to persist without significant
challenge. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,
610–11 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
112
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *67.
113
FULLER, ANATOMY, supra note 30, at 46–47.
114
EISENBERG, supra note 35, at 37.
115
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997) (“Where Congress
includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another
section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally
and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.” (quoting Russello v.
United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983))). The full maxim is expressio unius est
exclusio alterus (the expression of one implies exclusion of the other). Expressio
Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019).
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because of long-standing usage—such as the canon that later
enactments prevail over earlier enactments if they cannot be
reconciled, the Charming Betsy canon counseling avoidance of
conflict with international law, the canon enjoining courts to
interpret statutes in favor of Indian tribes, the presumption
against extraterritorial application of statutes, and various
doctrines in administrative law.116 Whatever their justification, adjudicators (including self-proclaimed textualists) show
no hesitation about applying these canons in resolving disputes over interpretation.117 The unstated reason for doing so
is that the canons are part of the settled practice of adjudicators and as such are legitimate.
Several commentators have discussed a phenomenon
called “superprecedent,” meaning, roughly, precedent that has
virtually no chance of being overturned.118 Superprecedent, in
my view, is simply precedent that has become part of settled
practice.119 Richard Fallon cites as examples of superprecedent decisions upholding the Social Security Act and the
use of paper currency as legal tender.120 These decisions owe
their immunity from overruling not to the quality of their reasoning, but because they have given rise to settled practices
that have generated enormous reliance interests. The Social
Security system—and for that matter the entire administrative
state—is not going to be overturned even if historical evidence
116
See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010)
(stating that there is a presumption against extraterritorial application of statutes); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 550 (1974) (explaining that a prior statute
is presumed repealed by inconsistent later statute); Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (stating that statutes are to be construed if possible as consistent with the law of nations).
117
See generally, Amy Coney Barrett, Substantive Canons and Faithful
Agency, 90 B.U. L. Rev. 109 (2010) (discussing the historical use of substantive
canons and the tension with textualist beliefs).
118
See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, The Rule of Law and the Law of Precedents, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1173, 1180 (2006) (“[B]edrock precedents—precedents that have
become the foundation for large areas of important doctrine.”); Michael J.
Gerhardt, Super Precedent, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1204, 1205–06 (2006) (“Super precedents are the constitutional decisions whose correctness is no longer a viable
issue for courts to decide . . . .”); Michael Sinclair, Precedent, SuperPrecedent, 14
GEO. MASON L. REV. 363, 365 (2007) (“To say a case is a superprecedent means it
is judicially unshakeable . . . .”).
119
See Amy Coney Barrett, Precedent and Jurisprudential Disagreement, 91
TEX. L. REV. 1711, 1735 (2013) (“The force of these cases [superprecedent] derives
from the people, who have taken their validity off the Court’s agenda.”); Michael J.
Gerhardt, The Irrepressibility of Precedent, 86 N.C. L. REV. 1279, 1293 (2008)
(“[T]he point at which a well-settled practice becomes, by virtue of being wellsettled, practically immune to reconsideration is the point at which that precedent
has become a superprecedent.”).
120
Fallon, Constitutional Precedent, supra note 95, at 1113, 1150.
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conclusively shows that it violates the original understanding
of the framers about scope of federal power. This is because
the Social Security system has been integrated into the warp
and woof of American society, with millions of individuals and
institutions organizing their lives and practices around it.121
This suggests that arguments from settled practice may be, if
anything, more powerful than arguments from precedent. I
suspect that precedent is invoked more commonly than settled
practice primarily because it is more accessible to lawyers and
adjudicators; proving settled practice, if it is not so obvious as
to be susceptible of judicial notice, requires expert testimony,
which is more costly.
The ultimate justification for using settled practice as a
decisional norm, of course, is that this is congruent with the
expectations of parties to an adjudication. No litigant can
claim surprise—disappointment, maybe, but not surprise—
when a court rebuffs efforts to upend settled practices.
4. Moral Arguments
I come now to two types of argument that I regard as more
qualified, in the sense that they depend on agreement about
the content of the norm. Moral arguments have been regarded
by certain commentators, most prominently Ronald Dworkin,
as being the ultimate touchstone of legitimate adjudication.122
This, I believe, mischaracterizes existing norms of legal practice. It is true that moral arguments—including references to
fairness, equity, and good faith—appear with some frequency
in adjudicated decisions.123 But they often appear in a supporting role, after arguments from original meaning, precedent,
and settled practice have been canvassed.124 Moral arguments
are generally designed to reinforce the conclusion reached on
121
Even Judge Bork, often regarded as a leading spokesman for originalism,
wrote that “[n]o judge would dream” of overruling precedents that violate the
original understanding if they have become “embedded in the life of the nation
. . . . accepted by the society . . . [and] fundamental to the private and public
expectations of individuals and institutions.” ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF
AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 158 (1990).
122
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 410–11 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN,
EMPIRE].
123
See Jules L. Coleman, Constraints on the Criteria of Legality, 6 LEGAL THEORY 171, 171 (2000) (“No one denies that moral principles figure in legal argument
and practice.”).
124
Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909,
1942 (2004) (“Policy and principle appear before us when the law runs out, and
also when the results the law generates even when it has not run out seem
extremely, and not just somewhat, unwise as a matter of policy or extremely, and
not just a little bit, unjust as a matter of morality.”).
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the basis of these more robust forms of argument, not to stand
alone as a primary ground for decision. As Melvin Eisenberg
has concluded:
[C]ourts do not have a legislative discretion to establish the
rules they think best on the basis of the moral norms and
policies they think best. Rather, they can properly establish
legal rules only by employing doctrinal and social propositions that have the requisite degree of support, in the manner
required by the institutional principles of adjudication.125

To be sure, one can occasionally find decisions that seem
to turn entirely on moral arguments. A good example is a decision discussed by Dworkin, which he calls Elmer’s Case.126
Elmer was a young man who murdered his grandfather in order to secure an inheritance. Although the New York statute of
wills contained no exception for such cases, the majority disallowed the inheritance, invoking the equitable maxim that no
person should be allowed to profit from his wrong.127 Note,
however, that the moral norm invoked in this case is one that
enjoys an extraordinarily high degree of consensus. I suspect
that there would be no dissent from the proposition that it is
morally wrong to murder someone to secure an inheritance.
Elmer’s Case thus shows that an adjudication can be considered legitimate, even if it cannot be justified by one or more
robust norms, if it rests on moral reasoning that enjoys a very
high degree of consensus.128
125
EISENBERG, supra note 35, at 151. Whether adjudicators can invoke moral
norms in support of decisions is related to the question whether the English
practice of interpreting statutes in light of precepts of equity carried over to American courts. See John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1, 85–104 (2001); William N. Eskridge, Jr., All About Words: Early
Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory Interpretation, 1776–1806,
101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 1082–86 (2001); John F. Manning, Deriving Rules of
Statutory Interpretation from the Constitution, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1648, 1672–80
(2001) [hereinafter Manning, Deriving Rules]. Whatever the original understanding of the “judicial power,” I agree with Manning that the Marshall Court marked a
decisive turn away from this practice in matters of statutory interpretation, in
favor of faithful agent interpretation. Id. at 1651. Nevertheless, an echo of this
tradition remains, primarily in the form of observations about the fairness or
justness of particular decisions principally justified on other grounds.
126
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 122, at 15–20 (discussing Riggs v. Palmer, 22
N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889)).
127
Riggs, 22 N.E. at 190.
128
By interpreting existing decisional norms to include moral norms that
enjoy a high degree of consensus, this article can be said to embrace a version of
what has been called “inclusive” or “soft” positivism. See generally, JULES L.
COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN DEFENCE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL
THEORY 103–19 (2001) (distinguishing “inclusive” positivism from “exclusive” positivism); see also HART’S POSTSCRIPT: ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE
CONCEPT OF LAW 355–70 (Jules Coleman, ed., 2001) (essays by Stephen R.
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Moral norms that are actively contested are unlikely to
provide a legitimate basis for an adjudication, at least not on a
stand-alone basis. Consider in this regard the contrasting
fates of two of the Supreme Court’s most notable decisions,
Brown v. Board of Education and Roe v. Wade.129 At the time
they were decided, neither decision was securely grounded in
arguments based on original meaning, precedent, or settled
practice. Racial integration of public schools was rapidly becoming an accepted norm in northern states but not in the
south.130 Brown was justified by the Court largely on the basis
of a social welfare argument—that segregation impaired the
educational progress of black children.131 Given that the mandate to integrate public schools was inconsistent with social
practice in the south, the decision met with strong resistance
in that part of the country, and remained largely unenforced
until reinforced by legislation and federal threats of funding
cutoffs more than a decade later.132 Today, racial segregation
is universally condemned as morally unacceptable, in all parts
of the country. Any person who questions the legitimacy of
Brown or denies that it is settled law would be denied confirmation to public office.133 This is because racial equality has become a moral norm enjoying strong consensual support.
Roe met a very different fate. Although, like Brown, it was
weakly grounded in robust decisional norms, Roe was quickly
hailed by one segment of society as a decision of great moral
significance because it reinforced the reproductive autonomy of
Perry, Brian Leiter, Liam Murphy, and Jeremy Waldron). The version of inclusive
positivism advanced here (if that is what it is) is limited by the qualification that
only moral norms that enjoy a high degree of social consensus can serve, by
themselves, as a ground for decision by an adjudicator. The same qualification
applies to social welfare arguments.
129
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954).
130
See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 291, 292–313 (2004) (noting that
when Brown was argued, “racial segregation in public grade schools remained
completely intact in the southern and border states and in the District of Columbia” and documenting that Justices from northern states, where segregation was
breaking down or increasingly regarded as immoral, were initially more receptive
to the ruling in Brown than were the Justices from southern or border states).
131
Brown, 347 U.S. at 494–95 & n.11.
132
See KLARMAN, supra note 130, at 389–99; GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE
HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 94–100 (1991).
133
Cf. Jeremy K. Kessler & David E. Pozen, Working Themselves Impure: A Life
Cycle Theory of Legal Theories, 83 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1819, 1840 (2016) (noting that
early versions of originalism that were hard to reconcile with Brown were “jettisoned in part to ‘make originalism safe for Brown’” (quoting Jed Rubenfeld,
Reply to Commentators, 115 YALE L.J. 2093, 2098 (2006))).
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women. At the same time, however, another segment of society
believes with equal intensity that the decision sanctions a form
of infanticide. No consensus has yet emerged resolving this
controversy.134 Unless and until it does, the legitimacy of Roe
and follow-on abortion decisions must be based on the ground
that abortion rights have become part of settled practice.135
5. Social Welfare Arguments
Social welfare arguments seek to justify decisions based on
their consequences. Like moral arguments, social welfare arguments have their champions as the ultimate touchstone for
legitimate adjudication, two jurists, Judge Richard Posner and
Justice Stephen Breyer, being the most notable examples in
this instance.136 Both argue that the ultimate criterion for
judging in an adjudication should be “pragmatism,” meaning
essentially doing the most to enhance aggregate social welfare.137 But these views are outliers. The notion that adjudicators should always exercise their discretion to promote social
welfare greatly overstates the role of social welfare arguments
in the social practice of adjudication.
Social welfare arguments, like moral arguments, tend to
play a supporting role in justifying judgments. A good illustration is the law of qualified immunity in civil actions brought
against state officials for violating constitutional rights in actions brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. One can find statements in these cases about the need for immunity to prevent
“dampen[ing] the ardor” of public officials.138 But as a recent
assessment concludes, “the Court has used more traditional
134
Cf. Public Opinion on Abortion, PEW RESEARCH CENTER RELIGION & PUB. LIFE
(Aug. 29, 2019), http://www.pewforum.org/fact-sheet/public-opinion-on-abortion/ [https://perma.cc/S7MA-Z394] (reporting that 61% of the public believes
that abortion should be legal in most or all cases and 38% of the public believes
that abortion should be illegal in most or all cases).
135
See Fallon, Constitutional Precedent, supra note 95, at 1116 (“[A] decision
as fiercely and enduringly contested as Roe v. Wade has acquired no immunity
from serious judicial reconsideration . . . .”).
136
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW
75–87 (2010) (comparing originalism and legal pragmatism); RICHARD A. POSNER,
LAW, PRAGMATISM, AND DEMOCRACY 57–96 (2003) [hereinafter POSNER, PRAGMATISM]
(discussing legal pragmatism and pragmatic adjudication broadly). Although
Justice Breyer does not commonly identify himself as a pragmatist, many commentators have done so. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Breyer’s Democratic
Pragmatism, 115 YALE L.J. 1719, 1720 (2006).
137
See BREYER, supra note 136, at 80–87; POSNER, PRAGMATISM, supra note 136,
at 59–60.
138
E.g., Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) (quoting Gregoire v.
Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949).
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legal arguments as the opening wedge for these policy concerns.”139 One can speculate that the “policy concerns” may in
fact carry more weight with the Justices than the traditional
legal arguments. But the fact remains that in justifying the
legitimacy of its decisions, policy takes a back seat to legal
arguments.
The same pattern predominates even in common law adjudication. One can of course perceive social welfare arguments
in common law adjudication, as in the emergence of strict liability in tort for manufacturers of defective products, where
early decisions cited concerns about the superior ability of
manufacturers to spread the costs of accidents.140 But academic writings that urge a more general use of explicitly
welfarist concepts, such as the “Hand formula,” have found few
adherents, other than former academics named to the
bench.141
A pervasive concern about invoking social welfare as a reason for resolving particular adjudicated disputes is the competence of adjudicators to make accurate assessments of the
welfare consequences of different decisional rules. Comparative institutional analysis would suggest that legislatures, and
even more plausibly administrative agencies, have better fact
finding and analytical capacities in assessing the welfare effects of decisional norms than do courts and other types of
adjudicators.142 There is also a concern about the variability of
assessments of social welfare over time, as new information
emerges and social values change. Adjudicators are supposed
to apply objective decisional norms that conform to the expectations of the parties, as advised by their lawyers.143 There is
an inherent tension between applying settled norms and adjusting policy based on the latest social science or policy prescriptions. Consequently only social welfare norms that enjoy
a strong consensus can provide a basis for legitimate adjudication on a stand-alone basis.
139
William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 79
(2018).
140
See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 39 (1970) (noting that loss spreading was the justification most often cited
among early legal writers advocating for strict liability in products cases).
141
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Traditional Versus Economic Analysis: Evidence from Cardozo and Posner Torts Opinions, 62 FLA. L. REV. 667, 680 (2010)
(finding little evidence that judges other than Judge Posner rely on the Hand
formula in deciding torts cases).
142
ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UNCERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF
LEGAL INTERPRETATION 208–11, 213 (2006).
143
See supra Part I.
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B. Support for the Typology
Any assertion about the structure of legitimate argument
in adjudication cries out for supporting evidence. This is inherently difficult to develop, given the practice by adjudicators of
blending different types of argument in justifying individual
adjudications (discussed below) and the difficulty of defining
the types of argument in easily measured terms.144 I offer here
two types of evidence, approaching the problem from different
ends of the adjudication spectrum and using very different
methodologies. The first is a thought experiment based on how
a nonspecialized legal advisor would respond to a request to
represent a party in an arbitration. The second draws on typologies of arguments used in Supreme Court decisions, as developed by close observers of the Court’s practice.
1. A Thought Experiment
Consider the following hypothetical. You are a law professor at a university that has an honor code.145 The honor code
sets forth a number of behaviors that will be deemed to violate
the code, including plagiarism. Students who are accused of
violating the code must appear before an honor code tribunal,
consisting of students appointed for this purpose. The case
against the accused is presented by a law professor who is
appointed to that role. Accused students are represented by
another law professor, typically appointed one case at a time. A
student, call him Peter, has been accused of plagiarism by a
classroom instructor. The charge is based on the instructor’s
discovery (using analytical software) that a term paper submitted by Peter included three strings of words, each consisting of
five to eight words and less than a complete sentence, that are
identical to strings of words found in an open-source internet
site that includes a discussion of the same topic. The term
paper contains no quotations marks around the words nor
does it include any citation to the internet site. You have been
appointed to defend Peter against the charge of plagiarism
before the honor code tribunal.
144

See infra subpart III.C.
For representative examples of honor codes, see, e.g., see, e.g., Procedures
for Student Discipline, COLUM. L. SCH. § 7, https://www.law.columbia.edu/
academic-rules/student-discipline#3 [https://perma.cc/68QC-EX8V] (last visited Jan. 3, 2020); The Student Judicial Charter of 1997, STAN.: OFF. COMMUNITY STANDARDS § 3, https://communitystandards.stanford.edu/policies-andguidance/student-judicial-charter-1997#judicial [https://perma.cc/7J33-XXJJ]
(last updated Oct. 2013).
145
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Although there may be factual issues that warrant investigation, the principal issue here is a legal one: Does the replication of three short strings of words from an internet site,
without attribution, constitute plagiarism within the meaning
of the honor code? This is your first foray as a representative of
an accused student before the honor code tribunal. The question is: How would you proceed in developing a legal defense of
Peter against the charge of plagiarism?
As a member of the legal community, presumptively socialized into the practices of that community, I submit that you
would proceed as follows. The first thing you would do would
be to review the language of the honor code. How does it define
plagiarism? Is it possible to argue that Peter’s conduct does
not fall within the definition? Is there other language in the
code, such as a characterization of offending behavior as “serious” or “significant” that might be employed to characterize
Peter’s conduct as de minimis? You might also review any
documents accompanying the promulgation of the code, or perhaps previous iterations of the code, to see if there is any language that might be used to characterize Peter’s conduct as
something that the enactors of the code would not have regarded as sufficiently serious to warrant a finding of a violation.
In short, the first thing you would do would be to explore potential faithful agent arguments that could be deployed to Peter’s
advantage.
You quickly discover that the honor code tribunal follows a
practice of issuing written decisions in resolving honor code
cases and that a collection of these decisions going back several decades is publicly available. The next thing you would do
would be to flip through these decisions, looking for any that
involve charges of plagiarism. It turns out there are quite a few.
You will want to identify those most closely on point to see how
they resolved the charge and what reasons they gave for their
resolution. You will want to develop, if possible, an argument
that prior honor code cases support an acquittal of Peter, or at
least warrant a relatively lenient sanction. You intuit that the
honor code tribunal will want to resolve Peter’s case in a manner consistent with the way previous tribunals have resolved
cases in order to assure predictability and equal treatment over
time. As should be obvious, this will constitute an argument
based on precedent.
After that, it is unclear how you would proceed. If faithful
agent arguments and arguments from precedent are sufficient
to make out a decent case in support of Peter, perhaps you
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would stop at this point. If these primary sources leave the
matter up in the air, or they suggest things are not looking good
for Peter, you might press further. One possibility would be to
canvas various professors about how they respond to evidence
of copying of short strings of words from internet sites. Perhaps an informal norm has developed at the university that
regards these sorts of copying as not worth charging as violations. Alternatively, it might make sense to gather information
about how other institutions of higher learning define plagiarism. Perhaps some kind of general norm or rule of thumb can
be identified which can be characterized as a settled practice
among such institutions in dealing with charges of plagiarism.
If Peter would be exonerated under the settled practice followed
by similar institutions, this will likely carry significant weight
with the honor code tribunal.
If all else fails, you might explore various moral arguments
that could render Peter more sympathetic or give cause for an
exculpatory excuse for his behavior. Perhaps his instructor
encouraged students to explore information on the internet, or
perhaps Peter thought that because the site was an open
source, ordinary rules against copying did not apply. Conceivably, similar arguments could be couched in social welfare
terms: students should be encouraged to use the internet, cutting and pasting from electronic sources has become routine
behavior, and on balance this should be encouraged, etc.
This thought experiment is obviously open to contestation.
Others may have a different view about how they would proceed in developing arguments in the hypothetical adjudication.
If my conjectures are plausible, however, they provide some
evidence in support of the classification of legitimate forms of
argument I have set forth.
2. Typologies of Supreme Court Arguments
A second source of support comes from various attempts to
classify the types of arguments relied upon by the much-studied Supreme Court in resolving contested cases. Philip Bobbitt
has developed perhaps the best known typology, in his book
Constitutional Fate.146 Based on a review of Court decisions
over the course of time he discerns six modalities of argument:
historical, textual, doctrinal, prudential, structural, and ethi146
BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79; see also PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991) (restating and analyzing the modalities he identified in

Constitutional Fate).
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cal.147 Although I do not agree with everything Bobbitt says
about the modalities of argument, there is at least a substantial
overlap with my classification. Bobbitt’s historical, textual and
structural arguments I would group together as different forms
of faithful agent argument.148 His doctrinal category corresponds to my argument from precedent.149 His ethical argument corresponds to my moral argument.150 And his
prudential argument resonates with my social welfare argument.151 The only thing missing from Bobbitt’s account but
present in mine is argument from settled practice, although
there are elements of this in his account of structural argument
and ethical argument.152
Another notable effort at developing a typology of argument
in constitutional cases is found in an early article by Richard
Fallon.153 He discerns five modalities of argument: text, historical intent, constitutional theory, precedent, and values.154
Here too I do not agree with everything he says. By constitutional theory, Fallon refers to theories like John Ely’s representation-reinforcing theory or theories about the purpose of
protecting freedom of speech.155 Theories in this sense are
surely part of academic literature about constitutional interpretation, but I see little evidence, and Fallon cites none, that
147

BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 7, 93.
See id. at 9, 26, 74; supra subsection II.A.1. To be clear, Bobbitt regards
textual arguments as permitting arguments about present meaning of the text,
rather than the meaning it had at the time of ratification. Id. at 26. I agree that
faithful agent arguments often proceed as if the current meaning of the text is
controlling; this is especially common in statutory interpretation cases. But this
is probably based on an unexamined assumption that the meaning of the words
has not changed. If perchance the current meaning and the original meaning
have diverged (this is rare), a faithful agent is required to adopt the original, not
the current meaning. The current meaning could be adopted only on the understanding that the enacting body, by choosing open-ended language, had delegated
authority to future interpreters to give content to the words in an evolving, common-law fashion. For a suggestion along these lines, see Thomas W. Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 40–46 (1985).
149
See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 40; supra subsection II.A.2.
150
See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 93–94; supra subsection II.A.4.
151
See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 61; supra subsection II.A.5.
152
See, e.g., BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 84 (stating it would be “absurd”
to undo a settled understanding about the President’s right to remove executive
officers without congressional consent); id. at 96–97 (treating decisions that protect family units long recognized by settled tradition as a form of ethical argument); supra subsection III.A.3.
153
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987) [hereinafter Fallon, Constructivist].
154
Id. at 1194–1209.
155
Id. at 1200–02 (citing JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW 4–9, 73–104 (1980)).
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they have been relied upon by courts in resolving discrete constitutional cases or that lawyers regard them as the kinds of
arguments that would carry weight with courts or other adjudicators. Fallon’s invocation of text and historical intent I would
lump together under faithful agent arguments. By “values”
Fallon means both moral values and arguments based on social welfare.156 So in the end, Fallon’s taxonomy differs from
mine only in its introduction of a non-factor (constitutional
theory) and in his omission of arguments from settled practice,
which may have taken on greater prominence in the years since
he wrote.
Jack Balkin has offered a third and more complex menu of
constitutional arguments. Balkin is a “new originalist,” someone who believes that that the Constitution must be interpreted according to its original meaning, but when its meaning
is unclear or when it must be applied to circumstances not
addressed by the text, it is necessary to engage in “constitutional construction.”157 In recent work Balkin has offered a list
of arguments which he believes are widely accepted by the legal
profession for engaging in this process of constitutional construction.158 Drawing on traditional studies of rhetoric, he
calls these arguments topoi or “topics.”159 The list is comprised
of arguments from text, structure, purpose, consequences, judicial precedent, political convention, custom, natural law or
natural rights, national ethos, political tradition, and honored
authority.160 Once again, there is substantial overlap with my
156

See Fallon, Constructivist, supra note 153, at 1204–09.
See Jack M. Balkin, Arguing About the Constitution: The Topics in Constitutional Interpretation, 33 CONST. COMMENT. 145, 145–46 (2018) [hereinafter Balkin,
Topics]. The strategy of dividing constitutional law into “constitutional interpretation” and “constitutional construction” can be credited to Lawrence Solum. See,
e.g., Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 453, 457 (2013). This strategy seems designed primarily to allow all
modes of argument in constitutional law to be assimilated to “originalism.” Id. I
do not consider the distinction because so far it has not entered into the discourse
of lawyers and courts. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 13–15 (2012) (“[The] supposed distinction between
interpretation and construction has never reflected the courts’ actual usage.”). The
perceived imperative to cloak all constitutional decisions in the mantle of originalism may be related to heightened anxiety about policymaking in the name of the
Constitution, given the great age of the document and the very low probability of
its being amended any time soon. See Thomas W. Merrill, Interpreting an
Unamendable Text, 71 VAND. L. REV. 547, 559–60 (2018) [hereinafter Merrill,
Unamendable Text].
158
Jack M. Balkin, The New Originalism and the Uses of History, 82 FORDHAM
L. REV. 641, 660 (2013) [hereinafter Balkin, New Originalism]; Balkin, Topics,
supra note 157, at 181–83.
159
Balkin, Topics, supra note 157, at 181.
160
Id. at 181–82.
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categories. I would lump text, structure, and purpose together
as modes of faithful agent argument; judicial precedent is
clearly the same as my category of precedent; political convention, political tradition and custom I would group together as
types of argument from settled practice; natural law or natural
rights I would classify as types of moral argument; and consequences I would call social welfare arguments.161 So in the
main, the differences between Balkin’s account and my account here relate to taxonomy rather than substantive disagreement. Balkin is surely right that one can find appeals to
national ethos and honored authority in opinions, but I regard
these “topics” as rhetorical flourishes supporting decisions
reached primarily on other grounds, rather than as independent grounds of decision.
A number of other esteemed commentators have recognized that courts are guided by multiple decisional norms regarded as legitimate, including William Baude, Michael Dorf,
Kent Greenawalt, Henry Monaghan, Robert Post, and Richard
Primus.162 These accounts are less comprehensive than those
of Bobbitt, Fallon, and Balkin, so I do not discuss them here.
But they too are not significantly inconsistent with the typology
I have offered.
C. Mixing and Matching
One frustrating aspect of changing the focus from legitimate interpretation to legitimate adjudication is that adjudicators are resolutely eclectic in their use of justifying arguments.
In common law cases, courts will concentrate on precedent but
may throw in arguments from settled practice, supplemented
with observations sounding in morality or social welfare. In
statutory cases, arguments from text and structure are likely to
be reinforced by arguments from legislative history, precedent,
settled practice, and perhaps even morality and social welfare.
In constitutional cases, precedent will dominate, with occasional references to originalist sources, morality or social welfare, and in some contexts settled practice will appear. In
short, adjudicators mix and match different modalities of argument in justifying their selection of decisional norms. As Bob161

See id. at 181–83; supra subsections II.A.1–5.
See Baude, supra note 4, at 2403–04; Dorf, supra note 84, at 1788; Greenawalt, supra note 49, at 659–60; Henry Paul Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723, 756, 763 (1988); Robert C. Post,
Theories of Constitutional Interpretation, 30 YALE L. SCH. FAC. SCHOLARSHIP SERIES
13, 19, 21, 23 (1990); Richard A. Primus, When Should Original Meanings Matter?,
107 MICH. L. REV. 165, 183–84 (2008).
162
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bitt observes, “The various arguments . . . often work in
combination.”163 Fallon insightfully notes that in practice, the
different modalities of argument are often deployed in such a
way as to reinforce the result reached by the adjudicator.164
This mixing and matching is no doubt an artifact of the
way adjudicated controversies are litigated and decided. The
lawyers for the contesting parties will develop rival “theories of
the case” which purport to integrate or synthesize different
argumentative sources.165 The adjudicator, if worth her salt,
will adopt one or the other of these theories or perhaps a synthesis of the theories as her own. Again we see how the practice of lawyers, as part of a community participating in the
social practice of adjudication, determines what constitutes legitimate adjudication.
The cost of mixing and matching is that adjudicators have
significant discretion in their selection of appropriate decisional norms, at least in hard cases. This is frustrating to
those who place a high value on predictability, stability, and
equal treatment of litigants in adjudicated cases.166
One possible way of constraining the discretion created by
the practice of mixing and matching decisional norms is to
determine if social practice includes an implicit hierarchy
among different modalities of argument. Fallon argues that
there is a hierarchy. He ranks the arguments in constitutional
cases in the following order from most to least important: text,
original intent, theory, precedent, and values.167 In a previous
article, I also argued for a hierarchy, to wit, in the following
order from most to least important: faithful agent arguments,
arguments from precedent and settled practices, and moral
and social welfare arguments.168 Balkin’s new originalism
clearly gives precedence to original meaning over various forms
of constitutional construction.169 In all these accounts, the
proffered hierarchies rest on an intuition that faithful agent
arguments carry the most weight in contemporary American
practice, with arguments from precedent, if only because of
163

BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 79, at 8.
Fallon, Constructivist, supra note 153, at 1237–42.
165
See, e.g., CAROLE C. BERRY & RAYMOND MICHAEL RIPPLE, EFFECTIVE APPELLATE
ADVOCACY 69 (5th ed. 2016).
166
See LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 33–94 (1964) (summarizing the
values promoted by the rule of law); JOSEPH RAZ, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in
THE AUTHORITY OF LAW: ESSAYS ON LAW AND MORALITY 210 (2d ed. 2009).
167
Fallon, Constructivist, supra note 153, at 1243–46.
168
Merrill, Interpretation, supra note 85, at 1590–92.
169
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 4, at 21–34; Balkin, New Originalism,
supra note 158, at 645.
164
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their extensive use, coming in ahead of arguments from settled
practice, moral and social welfare arguments. One can perceive here a glimmer of consensus about an unstated hierarchy. If the hierarchy were made more explicit, this might
constrain the discretion of adjudicators, at least to a degree.
Perhaps the most important form of ranking, already discussed, is that arguments from original meaning, precedent,
and settled practice are robust in a way that arguments from
morality and social welfare are not. The reason is that arguments from morality and social welfare are typically contested,
and hence, in many cases, will not incur the assent of the loser.
Consequently, arguments from morality and social welfare
should provide the principal basis for decision only when those
norms enjoy a very broad consensus.170
III
ARE APPEALS COURTS DIFFERENT?
To this point I have assimilated all forms of adjudication
together, treating adjudication as a unitary phenomenon in
which the legitimacy of decisional norms is determined largely
by the need to secure the assent of the loser. A potential objection to this approach is that there are important differences
among different types of adjudicators. In particular, appeals
courts are concerned primarily with resolving disputed questions of law. Given that appeals courts specialize in norm clarification and elaboration, it is possible that they proceed
differently than trial courts, administrative agencies, or arbitrators in determining the proper content of decisional norms.
This possibility would seem to be especially likely in considering high-level appeals courts, like the U.S. Supreme Court and
state supreme courts, which have very broad discretion in deciding what cases to hear, and hence have a significant degree
of control over their decisional agenda.
I agree that there are important differences between appeals courts and other types of adjudicators. And the contemporary U.S. Supreme Court represents the ultimate in
discretionary control over its docket, with the Court insisting
that it will agree to hear cases only when lower courts have
disagreed about decisional norms or the case involves an im170
See Dion Farganis, Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on
Supreme Court Legitimacy, 65 POL. RES. Q. 206, 213 (2012) (finding that support
for the Supreme Court is highest when opinions use conventional legal arguments
and declines when the Court’s reasoning becomes more controversial and
“extraconstitutional”).
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portant and unresolved question of law.171 Surely the Court
functions like a “lawmaker” in a way that my hypothetical professor tasked with representing a student in an honor code
arbitration does not. Perhaps this means that arguments from
morality and social welfare play a larger role in Supreme Court
cases than they do in primary level tribunals, and in this sense
the Supreme Court is closer to a legislative body than to an
adjudicator.
There is clearly some merit to the objection. Still, I think
dispute resolution remains the ultimate basis for establishing
legitimacy at all levels of adjudication. Consider in this regard
that the Supreme Court insists it will resolve cases only if they
present a live controversy between adverse parties that will be
resolved by adjudication. It will not decide “undifferentiated,
generalized grievance[s] about the conduct of the government.”172 All Justices remain committed to characterizing its
authority as based on dispute resolution, suggesting that this
self-characterization is critical to its continued legitimacy. Dispute resolution remains a constant even if the Court primarily
decides only important issues of law implicated by such
disputes.
Also, it is not true that appeals courts, including the Supreme Court, confine themselves strictly to questions of law
and ignore the facts.173 As Shapiro points out, appeals courts,
although nominally restricted to reviewing questions of law,
will always review findings of fact under some standard of review. Shapiro explains that appellate courts keep “clawing
their way back toward the facts” because they “continuously
seek to reiterate their connection with the basis of all judicial
legitimacy, conflict resolution.”174
As an illustration, consider a recent abortion decision,
Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt.175 The majority opinion
contains no discussion of the applicable decisional norms
other than precedent. The bulk of the opinion (and of the principal dissent) consists of an elaborate evaluation of the facts
about whether the Texas regulations being challenged would
present an undue burden for women seeking abortions in the
state—facts which the majority drew from an exhaustive review
171

See SUP. CT. R. 10.
Lance v. Coffman, 549 U.S. 437, 442 (2007).
173
See, e.g., Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2254–55 (2019) (Thomas,
J., dissenting) (describing the Court’s rewording of the question presented on
certiorari so that it could reconsider the factual findings of the state courts).
174
SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 34, at 42–43.
175
136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
172
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of the trial record, supplemented by the findings of other trial
courts, representations in amicus briefs, newspaper articles,
and even materials obtained through internet searches.176 Another recent example is provided by the conflict created when a
same-sex couple requested a wedding cake from a local baker
who refused on the ground that it would violate his religious
convictions.177 The Court resolved the case by closely scrutinizing statements in the record generated by a local nondiscrimination commission suggesting hostility toward the
religious claims of the baker.178 The highest court in the land
reverted to a type of review ordinarily performed by an intermediate appeals court under state administrative law. These examples are admittedly exceptional, yet they show that factfinding is hardly irrelevant, even in the highest and most discretionary appellate tribunals.
A more refined argument to the effect that high-level appeals courts are different might be that the audience changes
as litigation proceeds to higher levels of tribunals. Focusing on
changes in the audience is consistent with the social practices
conception of legitimacy adopted in this Article. If the audience
for the adjudicator’s decisions changes, the recognitional community that determines whether the adjudication is legitimate
may also change. Thus, the decisions of arbitration panels,
administrative law judges, and trial courts are almost invariably significant only to the immediate parties seeking resolution
of their dispute. As to these primary-level tribunals, it is plausible to say that the only critical variable is whether the loser
accepts the legitimacy of the ruling. But as the dispute moves
to higher level appeals courts, and especially as they move to a
tribunal of national significance like the U.S. Supreme Court,
the relevant audience whose views matter arguably becomes
much wider. As to such high-level tribunals, the objection
might run, the critical factor may be whether the general public
regards the decision as legitimate. This may suggest, in turn,
that for high level appeals courts the outcome reached by the
court is what is important in determining the legitimacy of the
process, as opposed to the decisional norms invoked by the
court in reaching the decision.179
176

Id. at 2311–18.
Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719,
1723 (2018).
178
Id. at 1729.
179
Evidence as to whether judges are influenced by public opinion is mixed.
See LEE EPSTEIN, WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE BEHAVIOR OF FEDERAL
JUDGES: A THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL STUDY OF RATIONAL CHOICE 88 (2013) (review177
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There is again clearly some merit to the objection. Certainly one can think of a number of U.S. Supreme Court decisions—such as Brown v. Board of Education,180 Roe v.
Wade,181 Bush v. Gore,182 Citizens United v. FEC,183 and
Obergefell v. Hodges184—which are headline news and which
are presumably familiar (even if not by name) to a large portion
of the general population. As to these decisions, the outcome
reached is clearly what matters to the general public, not the
particular decisional norms or line of reasoning used in reaching the decision. And if the Court consistently reached outcomes in these cases that resulted in strong rates of
disapproval from the general public, its standing with the public would presumably decline.
Again, there is some merit to the objection. High level appeals courts are probably constrained in cases of great moment
to reach outcomes that they perceive will be acceptable to a
wider audience, at least if it is possible to do so in a legally
credible fashion. But it is a mistake to think that the general
public pays much attention to the decisions of courts except in
relatively unusual circumstances. The vast majority of appeals
court decisions are of interest only to the parties to the case
and their lawyers. And even decisions that have a political
valence, in the sense that they divide judges along predictable
liberal-conservative lines, are rarely of interest other than to
lawyers who specialize in the area of law in question. This is a
wider audience than the parties to the case and their lawyers,
but it is tiny relative to the size of the general public or even the
legal community at large. And the specialist-lawyers, like the
lawyers who advise the parties to the controversy, will regard
such decisions as legitimate insofar as they comport with decisional norms that are regarded as legitimate, even if they disagree with the decision on policy grounds.
Another way of looking at appeals courts is that they are
not an exception to the dispute resolution model of adjudication but serve as an integral part of the strategy for assuring
ing studies). A conceptual difficulty in measuring the effect of public opinion is
that it is hard to know “whether judges are responding to public opinion or to the
same things that shape public opinion . . . .” Id.
180
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
181
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
182
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
183
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (holding that the First Amendment protects the right of corporations to spend unlimited sums of money in
support or opposition to candidates for election).
184
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
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the legitimacy of adjudication. As Shapiro observes, the right
to appeal helps take the sting out of losing an adjudication:
“[A]ppeal allows the loser to continue to assert his rightness in
the abstract without attacking the legitimacy of the legal system or refusing to obey the trial court.”185 Indeed, the right to
appeal reinforces legitimacy even if it is not exercised: “The
loser can leave the courtroom with his head high talking of
appeal and then accept his loss, slowly, privately, and passively
by failing to make an appeal.”186 Everyone is familiar with the
losing advocate who resolves to appeal the case “all the way to
the Supreme Court” but never follows through. In this sense,
appeal functions as a safety value which helps assure that
losers accept the legitimacy of the judgment—my test for legitimate adjudication. Whether appeals courts also serve to clarify
and elaborate decisional norms is a byproduct of their basic
function in helping to preserve the legitimacy of adjudication.
IV
SOME NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
My primary objective in this Article has been to explicate
and describe what I take to be the conditions that establish
legitimate adjudication and in particular the decisional norms
that reinforce the legitimacy of adjudication. My central claim
is that if we start by asking what legitimate adjudication is, we
find that a number of decisional norms are regarded as legitimate. I will close, however, with some normative thoughts
that, if they do not follow from this exercise, at least resonate
with it. Each normative concern focuses on a different aspect
of current judicial practice. What unites them is a trend away
from dispute resolution in the direction of law declaration and
with that trend, a rising danger of a more general challenge to
the legitimacy of the courts. This in turn imperils what is arguably the United States’ greatest asset: its reputation as a
country where both public and private actors are held to account by the rule of law.
A. Faithful Agent Interpretation of Old Texts
A primary normative implication concerns the problem of
achieving legitimacy in cases that are governed by old legal
texts.187 The principal example, of course, is the U.S. Consti185

SHAPIRO, COURTS, supra note 34, at 49.
Id.
187
The argument in this subpart is treated at greater length in Merrill,
Unamendable Text, supra note 157.
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tution, the main body of which is some 230 years old and which
has been amended only 27 times, with no amendment having
been proposed and adopted in the last 40 years. In our present
state of political and geographic polarization, further amendment seems unlikely in the foreseeable future given the difficulty of securing the assent of two-thirds of both houses of the
Congress and three-fourths of the states. A number of foundational statutes, including the Administrative Procedure Act, the
Sherman Act, the Voting Rights Act, the National Labor Relations Act, and the Clean Air Act have also defied attempts at
amendment in recent decades.188
As a general matter, as we have seen, the decisional norm
that enjoys the highest degree of legitimacy is faithful agent
interpretation. All or nearly all commentators concede that an
adjudicator is bound by the text of a relevant enactment that
has the force of law.189 The adjudicator is not permitted to
ignore the text or declare that it is outweighed by other considerations such as morality or social utility. It is also revealing
that many of the most vocal critics of originalism concede that
“courts should presumptively treat original meanings of relatively newly adopted provisions as dispositive.”190 These critics
thus concede that recently enacted and directly relevant texts
must be interpreted in accordance with the faithful agent
norm. Their position, at least implicitly, is that faithful agent
interpretation has an expiration date, such that it no longer
applies to enacted laws after they reach a certain age.
What might explain the falloff in the plausibility of faithful
agent interpretation as constitutional and statutory provisions
age? There is a simple functional explanation and a more debatable jurisprudential one. The functional explanation is that
as enactments age, it becomes more difficult to comprehend
what they were designed to accomplish and to translate this
understanding to modern controversies.191 Meanwhile, precedents pile up and tend to speak more directly to contested
188

Id. at 549–50.
See, e.g., FALLON, LAW AND LEGITIMACY, supra note 16, at 85 (“[W]hat ultimately matters today . . . is that everyone continues to accept the Constitution . . .
as valid, binding law.”); cf. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (1984) (“If a court, employing traditional tools of statutory
construction, ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise question
at issue, that intention is the law and must be given effect.”).
190
Berman, supra note 1, at 68.
191
See Robert W. Bennett, Objectivity in Constitutional Law, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
445, 463–64 (1984); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204, 218–22 (1980).
189
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issues.192 So precedent becomes a more accessible tool for
lawyers to draw upon in urging how decisional norms should
be formulated and a more persuasive basis for use from the
perspective of adjudicators. Some confirmation of this is provided by certain controversies where precedent is thin or has
depreciated in force due to nonuse. In these circumstances,
faithful agent arguments tend to return to the fore, even if the
enactment is very old. Recent controversies about the Second
Amendment and the Alien Tort Statute illustrate this.193
The jurisprudential explanation, advanced by Richard
Primus, is that the consent of the sovereign people fades away
as time passes and the enacting generation dies off.194 Thus,
the original meaning gradually loses is power to command the
assent of the governed. There is probably something to this,
although it remains true that even non-originalists generally
concede that the text of old enactments remains binding, even
if their original meaning is not.195 After all, non-originalists do
not argue that there is no duty to comply with the First Amendment or the Equal Protection Clause or other old provisions of
which they approve. The argument is over what these provisions mean. There is also the awkward fact that as the Constitution ages, it increasingly takes on the role of something like a
sacred symbol of the nation, which carries over into veneration
of the Framers and (perhaps) what they sought to
accomplish.196
Whatever the explanation, the demise of faithful agent arguments with respect to aged enactments is troubling, given
the superior status of these arguments in terms of the implicit
192
See Thomas W. Merrill, Originalism, Stare Decisis and the Promotion of
Judicial Restraint, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 271, 285 (2005).
193
See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117–24 (2013) (extensively canvasing original materials in interpreting a statute passed in 1789 and
rarely invoked thereafter); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 621–24
(2008) (engaging in extensive discussion of original meaning of the Second
Amendment when the most recent precedent was over seventy years old); id. at
652–70 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (reviewing similar material); see also Steven G.
Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: Text, Precedent, and Burke, 57
ALA. L. REV. 635, 687 (2006) (noting that the Court often reverts to original meaning when overruling constitutional precedents).
194
Primus, supra note 162, at 186–201.
195
See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 4 (acknowledging that the
text is binding but arguing that broadly worded clauses should be interpreted in
an evolutionary manner).
196
Michael Dorf has argued that originalist arguments often resonate as a
kind of celebration of the framers as “ancestors” or “heroes.” Dorf, supra note 84,
at 1801–10. To the extent there is something to this—and I think there is—then
deviating from the understandings of the generation that adopted Constitution
may be regarded as a kind of insult to the “founding fathers.”
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hierarchy of decisional norms. There are two standard responses to the problem. One, which is epitomized by Justice
Clarence Thomas’s innumerable dissenting and concurring
opinions, is to insist on adhering to faithful agent interpretation, without regard to the consequences.197 On this approach,
the many precedents and established practices that deviate
from the correct discernment of the original understanding
would be overruled. The prospect of this position being
adopted and carried out by the courts is highly remote given
the massive disruption it would entail.
The second standard response, which is much more popular in the legal academy, is to urge the substitution of dynamic
decisional norms, like moral arguments and social welfare arguments, for faithful agent interpretation of old and unamendable texts. This would seem to be a point of agreement that
unites otherwise quite diverse thinkers such as Ronald Dworkin, Bill Eskridge, and Richard Posner.198 The problem with
this response is that it is highly vulnerable to the charge that
the adjudicator is simply imposing its own policy preferences in
the form of a supposed interpretation of the text. This is likely
to lead (and has led) to the charge that the adjudicator is “legislating from the bench.”199
197

See generally, HENRY MARK HOLZER, THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS OF CLARTHOMAS, 1991–2006: A CONSERVATIVE’S PERSPECTIVE (2007) (collecting opinions of Justice Thomas advocating originalism).
198
See generally, DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 122; ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra
note 9; POSNER, PRAGMATISM, supra note 136.
199
For evidence that opinion about the legitimacy of the Court declines as its
decisions are perceived to align with the political preferences of the Justices, see,
e.g., Vanessa A. Baird & Amy Gangl, Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of
the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on Perceptions of Fairness, 27
POL. PSYCHOL. 597, 607 (2006) (“[O]ur results suggest that perceptions of fairness
are adversely affected when people receive information about a politically charged
Court, indicating a likely decline in public support for the institution if citizens
came to see judicial deliberations to be . . . politically driven . . . .”); Brandon L.
Bartels & Christopher D. Johnston, Political Justice? Perceptions of Politicization
and Public Preferences Toward the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 76 PUB.
OPINION Q. 105, 113 (2012) (noting that “[t]o the degree . . . the process . . .
becomes more visibly politicized, we should expect citizens’ differentiation of the
Court from the explicitly political branches to decrease, leading to even further
politicization”); Gregory A. Caldeira & James L. Gibson, The Etiology of Public
Support for the Supreme Court, 36 AM. J. POL. SCI. 635, 659–60 (1992) (“To the
extent that the Court becomes politicized or perceived as such, it risks cutting
itself off from its natural reservoir of goodwill and may become reliant for basic
institutional support on those who profit from its policies. This is a risky position
for any institution to adopt.”). For recent evidence that the public increasingly
perceives the judiciary as afflicted by political bias, see S.I. Strong, How Legal
Academics Can Participate in Judicial Education: A How-to Guide by Richard Posner, 66 J. LEGAL EDUC. 421, 422 n.5 (2017) (book review).
ENCE
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In short, the difficulty of engaging in faithful agent interpretation of old and unamendable texts such as the Constitution leads directly to the standoff described in the Introduction
between “originalists” and “living constitutionalists.” There is
no sign, as things presently stand, that either side in the endless debate over legitimate interpretation is posed to vanquish
the other.
A better solution to the problem posed by very old texts is
to shift the locus of decision toward enactments that are more
recent or more susceptible to amendment. In other words, adjudicators should try, if possible, to avoid resolving disputes
based on the Constitution and certain foundational statutes
and instead rely more on relatively recent statutes and administrative regulations. This would allow robust faithful agent
arguments—in the form of arguments from original meaning—
to resume their rightful place in the menu of decisional norms
used by adjudicators in resolving disputes between adverse
parties.
How might this be accomplished? One way would be to
revive and generalize the avoidance canons highlighted in Justice Brandeis’s famous Ashwander concurrence.200 Constitutional decisions should be avoided, if possible, along with
decisions grounded in other old and unamendable texts. Another way would be to interpret the Constitution and other
aged texts in a stand-pat or Burkean fashion in order to create
incentives for parties to seek legal change by securing the
adoption of relatively more amendable enactments (like statutes and administrative regulations).201 Stand-patism could
be advanced by leaning on nondynamic decisional norms, like
settled practice and a strict approach to precedent,202 and
downplaying relatively more dynamic norms, like creative uses
of precedent, and moral and social welfare arguments.203
Paradoxically, once enacted laws become very old, original
meaning arguments are likely to function like sources of legal
change, assuming (as is likely) that the law as defined by precedent and settled practice has diverged from what a faithful
reconstruction of original meaning would reveal. So using original meaning arguments when texts are old and unamendable
becomes a tool for activists seeking social change through liti200
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 346–48 (1936) (Brandeis,
J., concurring).
201
Merrill, Unamendable Text, supra note 157, at 589–90.
202
See id. at 591.
203
See id. at 592.
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gation.204 The basic point is that adjudicators should try to
steer the law in the direction of relatively more current or
amendable laws.205 This may be the only way to revive the use
of faithful agent decisional norms—the decisional norms that
appears to enjoy the highest level of legitimacy—in an era when
the Constitution and many framework statutes are very old.
B. Scrabble Board Precedentialism
A second normative implication concerns the manner in
which adjudicators deploy arguments based on precedent. Arguments from precedent are significantly constrained. One
constraint, which is familiar, is that precedent that cannot be
distinguished must be followed, unless overruled.206 Another
constraint, less familiar, is that precedent that has congealed
into settled practice will always be followed (so-called super
precedent).207 A third constraint, which follows from the passive nature of adjudicative bodies, is that precedent cannot be
revisited unless raised in a case brought by a party or in the
case of a high level appeals court with discretion over its
docket, unless the tribunal agrees to hear a case that challenges a precedent.208
Notwithstanding these constraints, there is still significant
room for different approaches to precedent. I will highlight one
difference, which I believe is reflected in the current practice of
the Supreme Court. I will describe the difference in terms of
two stylized models of precedent-following behavior set forth in
extrajudicial writing. In actual practice, arguments from precedent undoubtedly reflect a complex matrix of approaches to
following, distinguishing, extending, and narrowing prece204
J. HARVIE WILKINSON, III, COSMIC CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY: WHY AMERICANS ARE
LOSING THEIR INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-GOVERNANCE 57 (2012) (arguing that
originalism, given its multiple exceptions, is an “invitation to unbridled subjectivity” and often serves as a form of “activism cloaked as restraint.”).
205
See Merrill, Unamendable Text, supra note 157, at 594–99 (“Burkean interpretation of unamenable texts should promote governance by means of relatively
more amenable texts . . . because status-quo reinforcing interpretation, by definition, is inhospitable to efforts to achieve deliberate legal change through
interpretation.”).
206
See Sinclair, supra note 118, at 370 (citing Thomas R. Lee, Stare Decisis in
Historical Perspective: From the Founding Era to the Rehnquist Court, 52 VAND. L.
REV. 647, 654 (1999)).
207
See id., at 364 (citing William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Legal Precedent: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 19 J.L. & ECON. 249, 251 (1976)).
208
See Frederick Schauer, The Supreme Court, 2005 Term—Foreword: The
Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (2006) (noting the “small
proportion of the nation’s agenda that comes directly before the Supreme Court in
particular and the courts in general”).
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dents.209 The dichotomy I describe represents one pole cutting
across a variegated landscape of conventions, with most invocations of precedent by adjudicators falling somewhere in between these extremes.
The first conception of precedent following is the integrity
model, based on Ronald Dworkin’s theory of law as integrity.210
Dworkin illustrated his theory with the metaphor of a chain
novel, the idea being that each adjudicator must account for
chapters previously written by earlier authors, while retaining
the freedom to add new characters or plot elements consistent
with what has been laid down before.211 At a more conceptual
level, Dworkin argued that adjudicators must resolve disputes
in a manner consistent with the constraints of fit and principle.
The requirement of fit means that the adjudicator must rule in
such a way as to take into account what all previous adjudicators (at the same or higher level in the decisional hierarchy)
have decided. The decision need not replicate every detail of
every precedent, but a decision will be “flawed if it leaves unexplained some major structural aspect” of prior decisions.212
The requirement of principle means that the adjudicator must
adopt a theory that explains prior decisions and generates a
result in the present case that is the “best, all things considered.”213 For Dworkin, “the best” meant a principle based on
“political morality.”214 Dworkin was a bit unusual in that he
believed that there is generally one right answer to legal questions, once one factors in political morality, rightly understood.215 Most scholars today are less confident that questions
of political morality have a single right answer; at least, they
are likely to be somewhat skeptical that adjudicators have the
right answer to such questions.216
Still, one can interpret Dworkin’s theory in a way that imposes a significant degree of constraint on arguments from
precedent. The theory can be reformulated as stipulating that
arguments from precedent must satisfy the requirement of fit,
209
For an illuminating discussion, see generally Richard M. Re, Narrowing
Precedent in the Supreme Court, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014) (noting the many
ways the Court narrows precedent).
210
See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 122.
211
Id. at 228–38.
212
Id. at 230.
213
Id. at 231.
214
Id. at 216.
215
RONALD DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 41–43 (2006).
216
See id. at 42 (“Legal theorists have an apparently irresistible impulse . . . to
insist that the one-right-answer thesis must mean something more than is captured in the ordinary opinion that one side had the better argument . . . .”).
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that is, they must explain all “major aspects” of past decisions,
and they must be principled, in the sense that they articulate
some decisional rule that both accounts for the prior decisions
and provides a foundation for ruling in the present and foreseeable future cases. This might be a principle of political morality, but it could also be a principle grounded in a generalization
from original meaning, or from settled practice, or from considerations of social welfare.
A very different model of precedent following is one offered
in passing by Justice Scalia in his Tanner Lectures at
Princeton.217 He suggested there that the common law, which
he regarded as a pure form of decision by precedent, is like a
game of Scrabble.218 As he put it, “[n]o rule of decision previously announced [can] be erased, but qualifications [can] be
added to it.”219 The Scrabble Board model shares with the
integrity model the understanding that the adjudicator cannot
ordinarily erase the blocks of letters that have been previously
laid on the board. And it shares with Dworkin’s model the
understanding that the adjudicator, once the constraint of fidelity to past decisions is satisfied, exercises a significant degree of discretion. Where the Scrabble Board model differs is in
its understanding of how the judge exercises the discretion that
remains after the various constraints of the precedent system
are satisfied. The objective of the players in a Scrabble game,
to put it bluntly, is to score the most points. This is clearly
what Justice Scalia sought to convey by his metaphor. Subject
to the constraint against disregarding indistinguishable precedent, he regarded the precedent-following judge as one who
seeks to resolve cases so as to maximize his or her personal
legal and policy preferences.220 Moreover, the judge’s personal
preferences need not conform to any overarching principle that
brings coherence to the full range of decisions over time. The
preferences may simply reflect the judge’s desire to mold the
law in a way that the judge finds more congenial.221
217
See generally, ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System:
The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws,
in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW (1997).
218
Id. at 8.
219
Id. at 8. Switching metaphors, Justice Scalia also compared the precedent-oriented judge to a broken field runner: “distinguishing one prior case on the
left, straight-arming another one on the right, high-stepping away from another
precedent about to tackle him from the rear, until (bravo!) he reaches the goal—
good law.” Id. at 9.
220
See id.
221
This cynical view of precedent following is not new. See JEROME FRANK, LAW
AND THE MODERN MIND 163 (2009) [originally published 1936] (commenting
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Scalia’s image of precedent following as a game of Scrabble
thus presents a picture of the precedent-following adjudicator
as an aggressive manipulator seeking to advance his or her
legal and policy preferences. The adjudicator may not disturb
previous moves by others already on the board.222 But otherwise the adjudicator, if he or she can garner the requisite support from other like-minded members of the tribunal, is
expected to adopt distinctions, extensions, and qualifications
of what has been decided in the past in an effort to advance his
or her legal or policy preferences.223
A good example of the Scrabble Board model in action is
last Term’s decision in Kisor v. Wilkie.224 The Court took the
case to decide whether to overrule a longstanding administrative law doctrine, called “Auer deference,” which says that an
agency’s interpretation of its own regulation is “controlling unless ‘plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.’”225
The Court declined to overrule Auer, but proceeded to set forth
five major qualifications on the doctrine, some based on analogies to other administrative law doctrines, others on generalizations from previous decisions applying Auer, and still others
supported by statements in dissenting opinions.226 The upshot was that the Court could claim that it was following precedent (Auer) while at the same time significantly modifying the
law.227
“[s]omehow or other, there are plenty of precedents to go around”—enough, he
suggested, to support any outcome in any given case).
222
Scalia, supra note 217, at 8.
223
Id. at 8–9 (“The first case lays on the board: ‘No liability for breach of
contractual duty without privity’; the next player adds ‘unless injured party is
member of household.’ And the game continues.”).
224
139 S. Ct. 2400, 2407 (2019).
225
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) (quoting Robertson v. Methow
Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989)).
226
See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415–18. The qualifications were borrowed from
the jurisprudence elaborating on Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2415; taken from a dissenting opinion in United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 257–59 & n.6 (2001),
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2416; supported by language contained in a decision determining which of two agencies given divided authority is entitled to deference,
Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission, 499 U.S. 144, 153
(1991), Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417; and derived from the generalization of an
exception recognized in Christopher v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142
(2012), Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2417.
227
The outcome in Kisor was not particularly controversial among the Justices, other than that it was seen as a kind of precursor of some future showdown
over the fate of the Chevron doctrine. The division centered on whether to overrule
Auer and replace it with the standard of review associated with Skidmore v. Swift
& Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), as urged in Justice Gorsuch’s concurring opinion, see
Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2442–43 (Gorsuch, J., concurring), or to preserve Auer but
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The normative concern here is that the Supreme Court, at
least in cases where law is highly unamendable and arguments
from precedent dominate, is increasingly gravitating toward the
Scrabble Board model of precedent. This is particularly true in
areas of constitutional law that have a significant political valence, but fly below the radar of general public awareness.
Examples might include questions about state sovereign immunity,228 qualified immunity for officials charged with civil
rights violations,229 preemption of tort law,230 commercial
speech cases,231 the availability of class actions,232 and regulatory takings cases.233 What we increasingly see in these areas are decisions by the Court that leave all relevant
precedents undisturbed, but add qualifications or exceptions
that move the law in a direction favored by the legal or policy
preferences of the Justices in the majority.234 These moves
tend not to be supported by the articulation of some overarching principle, in the manner of the integrity model.235 Rather,
the decisions are justified by reading favored precedents
broadly, disfavored precedents narrowly, and by compiling
masses of quotations culled from a variety of authorities.236
The dissenting opinions tend to produce mirror image exercises, emphasizing broad readings of different precedents and
offering competing quotations.237 With the policy preferences
extensively reconstruct it, as pursued by the majority, see Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at
2415–18 (majority opinion). Quite arguably the majority’s approach, grounded in
Scrabble Board precedentialism, resulted in the greater change in existing law.
228
See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
229
See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
230
See Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009).
231
See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447 U.S.
557 (1980).
232
See Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 136 S. Ct. 1036 (2016).
233
See Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017).
234
For discussion of the path of regulatory takings decisions in terms of different models of precedent, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Supreme Court’s Regulatory
Takings Doctrine and the Perils of Common Law Constitutionalism, 34 J. OF LAND
USE 1, 8–26 (2018).
235
Id. at 4.
236
See Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing Dworkin’s
Chain Novel Theory: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1156,
1195–96 (2005).
237
For some qualitative evidence of this at the Supreme Court level, see generally Lawrence M. Solan, Precedent in Statutory Interpretation, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1165
(2016). Several studies of precedent-following behavior at the court of appeals
level reveal similar patterns. See e.g., Lindquist & Cross, supra note 236, at
1200–06 (finding that “[p]recedent appears to have a moderately constraining
effect on judicial freedom” and that “while our system of precedent creates some
path dependence in law, it is relatively weak, leaving judges ample opportunity to
abandon a given path should it appear, in the clearer light of hindsight, unwise”);
Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Friendly Precedent, 57 WM. & MARY L. REV.
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of the Justices now perfectly aligned with those of the party
that appointed them, the result has been aptly described as a
“political Court,” with the qualification that the Court operates
only in narrow areas of controversy and is constrained in other
ways, as I have described.238
The larger normative concern, in keeping with the themes
of this Article, is that the Court has been able to move toward
the Scrabble Board model only because it has amassed, over
many years, a large reservoir of legitimacy in the eyes of the
lawyers who appear before it and the larger public more generally.239 As things stand, although the Court increasingly resolves cases politically salient cases in ways that conform to
the majority’s legal and policy preferences, the losers continue
to acquiesce in its judgments. But with each decision, a small
portion of its reservoir of legitimacy is consumed. Eventually,
the reservoir may be depleted, and the losers may regard the
Court’s decisions as simply a matter of the “brute force” of two
against one.240 When this happens, the Court may face a general crisis of legitimacy.241
To head this off, the Court should strive to resolve cases, as
best it can, in accordance with objective decisional norms,
meaning settled forms of argument. It is difficult to do this
when faithful agent arguments fade away, as has happened in
constitutional law and increasingly in statutory and administrative law where political polarization and associated legislative gridlock have made large chunks of statutory law
unamendable. As this happens, precedent comes to the fore as
the dominant mode of legitimate argument. But argument
1789, 1819 (2016) (finding that “the ideological composition of federal appellate
panels—whether a Democratic or Republican President appointed members of the
panel—powerfully predicts the type of precedent they include in their opinions”);
Anthony Niblett & Albert H. Yoon, Judicial Disharmony: A Study of Dissent, 42
INT’L REV. OF L. & ECON. 60, 61 (2015) (finding that on divided appeals panels,
“[p]recedents that are cited only by the majority are strongly correlated with the
ideology of the majority judge; precedents that are cited only by the dissent are
strongly correlated with the ideology of the dissenting judge.”).
238
Neal Devins & Lawrence Baum, Split Definitive: How Party Polarization
Turned the Supreme Court into a Partisan Court, 2016 SUP. CT. REV. 301, 301–03;
see Richard A. Posner, The Supreme Court, 2004 Term—Foreword: A Political
Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 39 (2005). See supra Part I.
239
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
240
See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
241
Cf. NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT 138–39 (2008)
(“[W]ithin a particular jurisdiction, courts may accrue something akin to credit for
their longstanding conformity with standards of correct judicial decision, so that
the occasional act of extreme boldness . . . acquires authority not simply because
it is successful but also because the track record of a particular court suggests
that such action would never be undertaken lightly.”).
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from precedent, however constrained, is vulnerable to corruption in the form of Scrabble Board precedentialism.242 The
Court needs, at a minimum, to move closer to the integrity
model of precedent, supplemented by a more explicit use of
arguments from settled practice and by moral arguments and
social welfare arguments that enjoy a high degree of social
consensus.
The normative argument for resisting Scrabble Board
precedentialism is grounded, once again, in the belief that preserving the rule of law is vital to the future of liberal democracy
and that preserving the rule of law requires maintaining the
legitimacy of the dominant forms of adjudication in society.243
Conceivably, the courts will come to be perceived as hopelessly
politicized, and society will turn to arbitration as the primary
form of dispute resolution. But much will surely be lost if this
happens. Far better for the courts, and other adjudicators, to
remember always that the ultimate source of their legitimacy is
the belief of losers that their case has been resolved in accordance with objective legal norms, not because the adjudicator
harbors a personal preference for the winner.
C. Universal Injunctions
A third normative concern involves the recent wave of “nationwide” injunctions (perhaps more precisely, “universal” injunctions) against particular policies adopted by the executive
branch.244 This development reveals that the law declaration
perspective is not the monopoly of the Supreme Court. It has
the potential to move rapidly down the judicial hierarchy to
include federal district courts and perhaps other tribunals as
well.
Both the Obama Administration and the Trump Administration have been stymied by universal injunctions barring the
implementation of their respective immigration policies.245
Both have complained that the scope of these injunctions is
242

See supra notes 217–220 and accompanying text.
See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
244
See generally Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really
“Universal” Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
335, 336 (2018) (“Recent constitutional litigation has challenged the validity of
laws, regulations, and policies from the Obama and Trump Administrations regulating immigration and immigration-adjacent matters. Plaintiffs have brought
pre-enforcement lawsuits seeking to enjoin responsible federal officials from enforcing challenged laws, regulations, and policies.”).
245
For an overview of the cases, see id. at 340–48.
243
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improper.246 The universal injunction seeks to handcuff the
executive by exploiting an aspect of the law of equity—that it
acts in personam on the defendant.247 When a court of equity
obtains jurisdiction over a defendant, it can enter an order
directing the defendant to desist from certain actions or to take
certain affirmative actions in order to provide complete relief to
the plaintiff. Given this understanding, it is easy to see how a
federal district court that obtains jurisdiction over a federal
agency or department can assert the power to enjoin the defendant agency or department from taking action that the district
court regards as unlawful—anywhere.
The universal injunction could be called the nuclear option
in the assertion of judicial supremacy over the political
branches. In effect, it converts what would ordinarily be governed by the norms of stare decisis—the question whether one
legal actor regards itself as obliged to follow the legal understanding reflected in a judgment rendered by another legal actor—into a judgment that is binding on the executive with the
force of law. As most commentators have perceived, this is
deeply problematic.248 Two sitting Justices have called for the
Court, “at an appropriate juncture,” to reign in the practice.249
What is wrong with universal injunctions? To begin, the
universal injunction encourages an extreme form of forum
shopping.250 Opponents of the Obama Administration—most
prominently red state attorneys general—liked the Southern
District of Texas as their source for universal injunctions.251
246
Id. at 364; President Barack Obama, The White House, Remarks by the
President on the Supreme Court Decision on U.S. Versus Texas (June 23, 2016),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/06/23/remarkspresident-supreme-court-decision-us-versus-texas [https://perma.cc/9LZSYBKP].
247
See Wasserman, supra note 244, at 354–65.
248
In addition to Wasserman, supra note 244, at 338–39, see DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 436–37 (4th ed. 2010); Samuel L. Bray, Multiple
Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419 (2017);
cf. Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065,
1069 (2018) (acknowledging that limiting injunctions to injured plaintiffs should
be the default rule but that exceptions are appropriate).
249
DHS v. New York, No. 19A785, slip op. at 5 (Jan. 27, 2020) (Gorsuch, J.,
joined by Thomas J., concurring) at 5; Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2424
(2018) (Thomas, J., concurring).
250
As Bray observes, if plaintiffs do not succeed in getting the requested
injunction on the first attempt, they can “[s]hop ‘til the statute drops.” Bray,
supra note 248, at 460.
251
Dan Frosch & Jacob Gershman, Abbott’s Strategy in Texas: 44 Lawsuits,
One Opponent: Obama Administration, WALL ST. J., (June 24, 2016, 10:36 AM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/abbotts-strategy-in-texas-44-lawsuits-one-opponent-obama-administration-1466778976 [https://perma.cc/E5Q4-HXKN].
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Opponents of the Trump Administration prefer the Northern
District of California, Maryland, and Hawaii.252 The success of
these ideologically-motivated plaintiffs in obtaining universal
injunctions in these forums has generated extensive news coverage and is likely to encourage the public perception that the
federal judiciary is hopelessly politicized.253
The injunctions in question also undermine deliberation
about the appropriate decisional norms that should govern judicial action. They are typically temporary restraining orders
or preliminary injunctions, and as such are subject to revision
and even outright rejection after full consideration on the merits. They are also vulnerable to being stayed by higher level
tribunals.254 And as illustrated by the litigation over the
Trump Administration’s so-called travel ban, the initial preliminary injunction can be mooted by successive revisions by the
executive branch in the matter under review.255 Reflecting the
views of a single federal judge, a universal injunction lacks the
authority of a Supreme Court decision or even a decision by a
panel of a court of appeals.256 Such an injunction, especially
on an issue of great political controversy like immigration policy, is unlikely to achieve general assent about the requirements of the law. It is more likely to embroil the federal
judiciary in ongoing controversy and accentuate the charge
that judges are just another type of partisan actor.257
The universal injunction also frustrates the intercircuit
percolation that helps the Supreme Court decide when to intervene and illuminates the arguments in favor of different legal
understandings.258 When a federal district court issues a uni252
See Rebecca Davis O’Brien & Sadie Gurman, States File Suit Against Trump
Administration over Wall Emergency, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 18, 2019, 9:27 PM), https:/
/www.wsj.com/articles/california-lawsuit-is-expected-on-wall-emergency11550535544 [https://perma.cc/VH2A-V4RX].
253
The Editorial Board, The Judicial Injunction Dysfunction, WALL ST. J., (July
28, 2019, 6:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-national-injunction-dysfunction-11564348739 [https://perma.cc/K4HQ-ZC3K]; Robert Knight, Dems
Respect the Constitution Only When it Suits Them, WASH. TIMES, (Jan. 18, 2020),
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2020/jan/18/democrats-respect-theus-constitution-only-when-it/ [https://perma.cc/JZ29-KLQ6].
254
See Wasserman, supra note 244, at 379.
255
See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403–06 (2018) (recounting the
procedural history of the “travel ban”).
256
See Bray, supra note 248, at 461–62.
257
President Trump has disparaged the district judges who have entered universal injunctions as “so-called judges,” and Attorney General Jeff Sessions condemned the injunction entered against the travel ban as lawless action by “a
single judge sitting on an island in the Pacific.” Wasserman, supra note 244, at
364 (quoting Attorney General Jeff Sessions).
258
See Wasserman, supra note 244, at 378–79.
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versal injunction the matter zips straight up the judicial hierarchy on a very fast track. The administration will seek a stay
from the court of appeals, which must resolve the matter on
hastily prepared papers and an incomplete record under a
standard of review that gives deference to the district court. If
the court of appeals denies a stay, the administration must go
to the Supreme Court for a stay, which again must rule on
hastily prepared papers and an incomplete record and without
the benefit of full opinions by any court of appeals, including
the court below.259 This short-circuits the process that ordinarily leads to the resolution of controversial legal questions.260
The last concern, and to my mind the most serious, is that
the practice of issuing nationwide injunctions of executive policy could jeopardize the received understanding that the executive has a legal duty to enforce all federal judicial orders. As
previously noted, this duty rests on statutory and conventional
grounds.261 It is not compelled by the Constitution. Which
does not mean it is unimportant. One can argue it is the
lynchpin that makes ours a country governed by the rule of
law. One danger here is a funding cutoff or amendment of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 to deny enforcement of certain categories
of universal injunctions or perhaps all injunctions against the
government. The greater danger is outright defiance of such
orders. The Parrillo study, previously mentioned, indicates
that defiance of judicial injunctions is not a hypothetical possibility.262 In recent history, it has occurred in low visibility contexts, involving structural injunctions affecting prisons,
entitlement programs, and the like.263 In the current climate,
one can readily imagine defiance coming from the top, justified
perhaps by claims of national security and the status of the
President as Commander in Chief. The slope from constitu259
See DHS v. New York, No. 19A785, slip op. at 3–4 (Jan. 27, 2020) (Gorsuch, J., and Thomas, J., concurring) (“Rather than spending their time methodically developing arguments and evidence in cases limited to the parties at hand,
both sides have been forced to rush from one preliminary injunction hearing to
another, leaping from one emergency stay application to the next, each with
potentially nationwide stakes, and all based on expedited briefing and little opportunity for the adversarial testing of evidence.”).
260
In this respect, the universal injunction suffers from infirmities closely
analogous to those that would arise if the executive branch were required immediately to acquiesce in any decision invalidating a regulation or administrative
interpretation. See Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, Nonacquiescence by
Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE L.J. 679, 757 (1989).
261
See supra at notes 54–78 (discussing enforcement constraint).
262
See supra at notes 66–68.
263
Cf. Robert A. Schapiro, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitutional Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 231, 238 (1989).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\105-5\CRN503.txt

1460

unknown

Seq: 66

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

25-AUG-20

10:15

[Vol. 105:1395

tional republic to authoritarianism may be slipperier than we
like to think.
Unfortunately, we cannot rely on the good sense of every
federal district judge to forbear from entering universal injunctions. In search of a solution, I suggest we turn to the distinction between the judgment power and the conventions of stare
decisis. With respect to judgments, I think Samuel Bray has
the right idea: the traditions of equity and the understanding
that injunctions operate in personam should be clarified to
specify that injunctions are binding not only on the named
defendant but also that they run only in favor of the named
plaintiff.264 In effect, the law of standing, which limits relief to
those who can show actual injury that will be redressed by
eliminating allegedly unlawful action, should be extended to
requests for injunctive relief.265 Enjoining a federal agency or
department to act or desist from acting in certain ways with
respect to “all the world” should be disclaimed. Class actions
seeking to enjoin the government should be possible, but only if
they satisfy the requirements of Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Suits by state attorneys general should be
possible, but only on behalf of specific state institutions shown
to have Article III standing, and then any equitable relief should
be limited to those institutions. An analogy would be to the
understanding that principles of offensive collateral estoppel
do not apply to the federal government, precisely for the reason
that this would eliminate the needed percolation of issues
before they must be resolved by the Supreme Court.266
The Bray solution, standing alone, is subject to the familiar
objection based on vertical equity. If one plaintiff, represented
perhaps by a state attorney general or pro bono, secures an
injunction against the executive branch, why should other similarly-situated persons, perhaps not so lucky in their representation, be forced to sue to secure the same relief? The answer is
that this ignores the operation of the conventions of stare decisis. To be sure, the reasoning of the district court that enters
the injunction is not binding on other courts, not even within
the same district. But if the decision of the district court is
affirmed on appeal, this decision will be binding on all district
courts in the circuit. And district judges will make short shrift
of the government if it persists in litigating the issue in the
circuit. The courts may award attorneys fees to prevailing par264
265
266

Bray, supra note 248, at 469–80.
Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2428 (2018) (Thomas, J. concurring).
United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 158–59 (1984).
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ties under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), on the
ground that the government’s position is not substantially justified.267 The prospect of fee-shifting will attract more representation. If the matter plays out the same in other circuits,
the government will likely acquiesce and drop or modify the
contested policy. If the circuits disagree, the Supreme Court
will likely intervene. And the executive will almost surely comply with the Supreme Court judgment—at least one that is the
product of the ordinary process of careful deliberation reflecting multiple points of view.
The process is unlikely to appeal to the impatient. But it
has worked, over a significant span of time, in achieving a
significant degree of coordination about the requirements of
the law, even in the face of significant disagreement about the
correct interpretation of the law. A renewed emphasis on legitimate adjudication—and with it, the dispute resolution function
of adjudicators—would go far to restore a norm of self-restraint
with respect to the proper scope of judicial injunctions.
CONCLUSION
Questions about what constitutes legitimate interpretation
of enacted law, most prominently the Constitution, have been
with us since the founding. They have become more urgent in
recent times, as arguments between originalists and living constitutionalists grow heated and remain unresolved. Originalists seem to have the better case as a matter of theory; living
constitutionalists can claim greater congruence with judicial
practice. A similar unhappy choice dominates debates about
statutory interpretation. Textualists and purposivists battle
for supremacy as a matter of theory; dynamic interpretation
seems to offer a better account of actual practice. The key
point I advance in this Article is that the severe tradeoff between legitimacy and descriptive accuracy can be eliminated by
adopting a different theory of legitimacy. If we shift the focus
from legitimate interpretation to legitimate adjudication, embrace a conception of adjudication as dispute resolution, and
borrow the familiar conception of legitimacy advanced by
H.L.A. Hart and the positivists based on social practice, the gulf
between legitimacy and actual practice largely disappears.268
The payoff from changing the focus from legitimate interpretation to legitimate adjudication is potentially large. The
267
28 U.S.C. § 2412(d) (2018). See generally Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S.
552 (1988) (interpreting various aspects of the Act).
268
See HART, supra note 15 and accompanying text.
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literature on legitimate interpretation, in both constitutional
and statutory interpretation contexts, suggests we must make
a painful choice: either adjudicators must change their practices in order to achieve legitimacy, or we can endorse existing
practice at the expense of nagging doubt about whether that
practice is legitimate. When we refocus the inquiry by asking
what decisional norms are regarded as legitimate in adjudicating a dispute between adverse parties, we discover much
greater congruence between what is regarded as legitimate and
existing practice. In particular, we find that not just arguments about original meaning but also arguments from precedent and settled practice are regarded as legitimate. And we
learn that there is even an accepted supporting role for arguments from morality and social welfare. The topography of
legitimate decisional norms may fall short of the exuberant
exhortations to promote social justice, associated with living
constitutionalism and dynamic statutory interpretation.269
But it offers a much better match with actual practice than the
stern injunctions of originalists and textualists.
I have argued that in determining when adjudication is
legitimate, the social practice that matters is that of the parties
to the adjudication, as advised by their lawyers. It is critical
that the loser in the adjudication not regard the outcome as
simply a matter of the adjudicator harboring a personal preference for the winner. Viewed this way, the decisional norms
that are regarded as legitimate in an adjudication are those
that correspond to the expectations of the parties. I have argued that three types of decisional norms are robustly legitimate: faithful agent arguments, arguments from precedent,
and arguments from settled practice. Other more qualified decisional norms are moral arguments and social welfare arguments. Adjudicators mix and match these decisional norms in
various ways, depending on the relative strength of the arguments in any given case. This does not appear to undermine
the legitimacy of the adjudication, perhaps because adjudicators apply an unstated hierarchy among norms, including the
understanding that moral and social welfare arguments play
only a supplemental role unless the particular norm enjoys a
very high degree of consensus.

269
See WILKINSON, supra note 204, at 20 (characterizing living constitutionalism as “replete with vague exhortations about ‘human dignity,’ ‘evolving standards of decency,’ and the perceived demands of justice and needs of society”)
(footnotes omitted).
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Social practice evolves over time, and I worry that the social practice of adjudication may be evolving in troublesome
ways. One concern is the age and extreme unamendability of
the Constitution and many framework statutes, which tend to
make faithful agent arguments problematic. Another is that
arguments from precedent have increasingly come to resemble
Scrabble Board precedentalism, which is essentially a constrained but weakly disguised form of political judging. A third
is the recent emergence of the universal injunction as a weapon
in the struggle over national immigration policy. Unless resisted, these developments could jeopardize the high level of
legitimacy that adjudication has long enjoyed in our society.
Because legitimate adjudication is a vital ingredient of preserving the rule of law, this is troublesome indeed.
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